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Abstract 
Following the 1959 victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States government along 
with the CIA and their Cuban émigré allies immediately undertook a campaign of subversion and 
terrorism against the Cuban revolution. From 1959 until 1963 a clandestine war was waged 
between supporters of the revolution and the counter-revolutionary organizations backed by 
Washington. This project is a new synthesis of this little-known story. It is an attempt to shed 
light on a little known aspect of the conflict between the United States government and the 
Cuban revolution by bringing together never-before seen primary sources, and utilizing the two 
distinct and separate historiographies from the U.S. and Cuba, concerning the clandestine 
struggle. This is the story of Cuba’s resistance to intervention, the organization of the counter-
revolution, and finally how the constant defeat of CIA plots by the Cubans forced changes in 
U.S. strategy concerning intervention in Cuba and in other parts of the developing world that 
would have far-reaching and long-last effects. 
1 
Introduction 
Sabotage 
The mouth of Havana Harbor is guarded by three sentinels of Cuba’s Spanish colonial 
past.  For hundreds of years, ships entering the port have sailed slowly past El Morro, the 
lighthouse-tipped stone fort that can be seen from all parts of the malecón seawall, one of the 
most recognizable symbols of Havana’s romantic image. Across the bay sits the much smaller 
and much older Castillo de Real Fuerza, the stone castle where the original founders of Cuba’s 
capital first laid the foundation of the city. Situated beyond this, on the opposite bank of the sea 
wall behind El Morro, sits La Cabaña Fortress, the largest and most imposing stone structure in 
the Caribbean.  Once a ship passes these guardians of the city, it enters the docks that empty 
directly onto the narrow and winding streets of Old Havana, the heart of the city. Like so many 
before it, on May 4, 1960, the French cargo ship La Coubre made its way past the forts and made 
port at the Pan-American dock at the far corner of the harbor. Dock workers were in a particular 
rush on this cool May afternoon because La Coubre was carrying extremely important cargo: 
rifles and ammunition for the National Revolutionary Militias meant to defend the newly 
triumphant Cuban Revolution against its internal and external counter-revolutionary enemies.1
The Cuban Revolution was little more than a year old and had been under political threat 
from its neighbor, the United States, from the very beginning. Fulgencio Batista, the United 
1 Keith Bolender, Voices from the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism against Cuba (London: Pluto Press, 
2010), p. 178-182. 
2 
States’ strong-man in Cuba, was gone, as were the casinos and brothels of the old era. In their 
place, the new Cuban Revolutionary Government and its supporters were attempting to build a 
new Cuba, independent from Washington as well as the oligarchic rule of the sugar barons from 
the past. Cuba’s political landscape was changing and a great battle of ideas had begun. The 
Cuban polity was in a position where it would have to choose between a new political dynamic 
and the so-called “politiqueria” of the past.2 In most cases the general Cuban public turned out
in support of the revolutionary initiatives rather than to aid the counter-revolutionaries. These 
decisions would create a new Cuban identity born of popular defense of the new revolution 
despite tension between Fidel Castro’s government and subsequent U.S. administrations. 
There was a considerable amount of tension in the days following Batista’s flight 
between Havana and Wall Street over the expanding nationalizations of U.S. business interests, 
as well as the demands from Cuba’s young leaders for Washington to respect the island nation’s 
sovereignty. For months, scattered groups of domestic counter-revolutionaries had been 
sabotaging factory equipment and burning sugar cane fields in attempts to disrupt the Cuban 
economy. Unmarked planes had strafed the industrial center of Havana just months before the 
arrival of La Coubre. Moreover, dictator Rafael Trujillo, of the Dominican Republic, who had 
recently taken in the ousted Batista, plotted to derail the Cuban Revolution, also with 
Washington’s backing.3 In response, the Cuban Government formed armed citizens’ militias and
purchased arms to defend the Revolution.4 The counter-revolutionaries focused on the new arms
2 Politiquería roughly translates to “politics as usual” in Cuban slang. 
3 Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations in Cuba 1959-62 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004), p.20-
31. 
The Cuban Rebel Army was in the process of reorganizing and rearming after disbanding the former army of the 
Batista dictatorship. Most of the equipment available to the Rebel Army and the National Revolutionary Militias 
was left over from the former regime and included weapons left over from the armed struggle in the mountains. 
During the period from 1959 until late 1960, there were almost no weapons purchased from abroad due to the 
sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Cuba. Belgium was among the only nations (other than initial small amounts 
3 
shipments coming into Cuba as viable targets. La Coubre was one in a long line of bombings to 
take place in the first two years of the Cuban Revolution. 
La Coubre sailed from Antwerp and made stops throughout the Atlantic, including a 
short stop in Miami, before reaching Havana.5 Once docked, the workers quickly began
unloading the weapons. It was 3:00 pm and the streets of Old Havana were teeming with people 
going about their business.6 Vendors sold their wares in the narrow alley-ways, children played
in the colonial courtyards, and the elderly sat and conversed in the Plaza de Armas as they 
always have, and still do.  All of that changed at 3:15 pm when an explosion on the deck of La 
Coubre rocked the port. Citizens exited nearby buildings to see what was happening as dock 
workers tried to reach the wounded. Government officials conducting a meeting a few miles 
away rushed to the scene to assess the damage and provide assistance. Che Guevara and Fidel 
Castro personally pulled a number of workers from the burning wreckage of trucks filled with 
munitions. Thirty minutes later, a second and much more destructive explosion almost 
completely destroyed the ship.7 The force of the blast was so strong that it shattered nearly ninety
percent of all of the windows in Old Havana.8 A cloud of ash and smoke filled the harbor and
choked the narrow streets of the old city. Elderly Cubans who lived in the city at the time 
remember hearing the explosion and seeing the plume of smoke, even on the outskirts of the city.  
Even today, the anniversary of the bombing of La Coubre is a day of remembrance of those 
sold by the Soviet Union) to sell small arms to Cuba. This meant that Cuba had only restricted access to defensive 
weapons at this time, whereas the counter-revolution received a steady flow of funding and weapons from 
Washington. This would change in early 1961, when the Soviets became the single arms exporter to Cuba, allowing 
the embattled Revolutionary Government to rearm and reorganize an effective defensive fighting force. Juan Carlos 
Rodríguez, The Inevitable Battle: From the Bay of Pigs to Playa Girón (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2009), 
p. 15-21.
5Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations in Cuba 1959-62 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004), p. 45-
46. 
6 The Docks are literally yards from the heart of the old city. 
7 Interview with Juan Luís Rodríguez Infante, in Kieth Bolander, Voices From the Other side: An Oral History of 
Terrorism Against Cuba (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 182-185. 
8 Bolender, p.179. 
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killed in terror attacks against Cuba.9 Rosario Olegario Velasco Gómez, a Cuban citizen whose 
husband was killed in the explosion, sums up the general sentiment of many Cubans at the time, 
during this and other counter-revolutionary attacks: “He was killed doing an honest day’s work 
to help his fellow Cubans.”10 By the end of the day, more than seventy-three people, mostly dock 
workers and ship crewmembers, were killed, and over 100 people sustained serious injuries.11 
The day after the explosion, crowds well above the hundreds of thousands marched in a 
funeral procession from the docks to the Colón Cemetery.12 At the entrance to the cemetery, at 
the corner of 12th and 23rd Streets in Vedado, the more modern section of the city, the leaders of 
the Cuban Revolution spoke to the angry and grief stricken crowds.13 Fidel Castro expressed 
their anger and interpreted the series of events, beginning with the threats from the Eisenhower 
and Nixon Administration, to the attacks on the Cuban economy and finally the bombing of La 
Coubre, as a declaration of a not-so-secret, yet hidden, war between Washington and Havana, 
and between the Revolution and the representatives of the former upper and middle classes that 
saw their business interests threatened by the reforms enacted by the new government. Castro 
called upon the crowd to remain vigilant, and to be prepared to fight for their cause. He reminded 
                                                          
9 Today there is a state sponsored organization called “The Association of the Victims of La Coubre” which helps 
preserve the memory of those killed and wounded that day in 1960. They are represented in the large body of Cuban 
popular organizations alongside those of the other organizations that promote the memory of other acts of terrorism 
against Cuba, in particular, the bombing of Cubana Airline 455 in 1976. 
10 Interview with Rosario Velasco, in Keith Bolender, Voices From the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism 
Against Cuba. P.188-189. 
11 In the following weeks, the authorities and independent international bodies launched investigations, all of which 
concluded that an act of sabotage had been committed.  Investigators attempted to recreate possible scenarios that 
could have caused an accidental explosion on La Coubre. They went so far as to drop some of the boxes of 
munitions from aircraft to see if they would explode on impact. This was meant to prove that the ammunition was 
not fragile and would not likely have ignited just from the movement in the crates. Furthermore, investigators found 
a great deal of evidence of sabotage, including the remains of pipe bombs. The evidence showed that not only were 
these bombs set to explode, but that they were set to explode separately, a half-hour apart, the idea being to draw a 
larger number of people to the scene with the first explosion, so that the casualties would be higher when the second 
explosion occurred. The U.S. government denied any involvement, as did influential representatives of the émigré 
community in Miami. 
12 Havana’s largest cemetery. 
13 Julio García Luis, The Cuban Revolution Reader: A Documentary History of Fidel Castro’s Revolution (Ocean 
Press: Melbourne, 2008), p. 67-68. 
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the crowd that the Cuba of 1960 was part of the “centennial generation,” a new generation 
prepared to reclaim Cuba’s independence and defend it.14 Cuba today, he said, “was not Cuba of 
the 1890s, or of the 1930s, but a new Cuba that would never attack its neighbors or threaten war, 
but would defend itself to the last drop if its blood.” Castro reminded the public that the 
revolution that was under attack was part of a longer lineage of struggle and was not only a 
product of the contemporary period. He sought to remind supporters of the revolution that they 
were repaying a century-old debt to history. Castro called for a “Struggle Against Bandits,” a 
struggle against the secret forces of the Washington-backed counter-revolution who were setting 
out to derail the Cuban Revolution.15 
In Washington and in Miami, CIA station chiefs set up shop on the campus of the 
University of Miami and recruited assets directly from the middle-class Cuban community and 
the old ruling landowner class. They intended to form a secret army that could be used to 
infiltrate Cuba and strike fear into the hearts of revolutionary supporters in an effort to 
undermine popular support for Castro and the Revolution, which was at an all-time high. They 
used every method available, from murder to terrorism.16 The Miami CIA station (JMWAVE) 
was, for all intents and purposes, a very public recruiting center and anti-communist think tank. 
Don Bohning, a former correspondent involved with the Miami Herald’s Latin America desk for 
decades, has since composed an effective layout of the CIA apparatus in Miami at the time. He 
claims that the CIA and its umbrella organizations were so far reaching in Miami, “that the 
                                                          
14 The so-called “Centennial Generation” refers to the younger generation that not only had been the primary 
vanguard against Batista, but represented the fulfilled idea of José Martí. It is in this idea that the Cuban Revolution 
is descended directly from the wars of independence in the nineteenth century. 
15 Fidel Castro, “Homeland or Death”, Havana, Cuba, May 5 1960, reproduced in The Cuban Revolution Reader, p. 
68-71. 
16 See Appendix A and B. 
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general public though well aware of it only saw the tip of the iceberg.”17 By 1963, the JMWAVE 
was the single largest CIA station outside the agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The 
Miami operation was larger than that of Berlin at the height of the Cold War. The CIA knew 
exactly who to recruit for its infiltration teams. 
The members of these groups were concerned with their threatened business interests and 
were steeped in the McCarthy-Era Red Scare. Many were of the middle class and felt betrayed 
by Castro and the revolution because of the persistent hard line the revolution took regarding 
U.S. industry on the island, nationalization, and rebel demands for national sovereignty. Many of 
these men and women saw themselves as former supporters of the revolution (or at the very least 
open-minded about it), who had not expected more than a simple change of politics, as usual, in 
their favor. There had been political upheaval in Cuba for a century: what would have led them 
to think that this time would be any different? It was these middle class men and women who 
would fill the ranks of the counter-revolution. The battle between the Revolution and these 
counter-revolutionary organizations is known in Cuba as the “Struggle Against Bandits.” Off the 
island, this struggle has been relegated to nothing more than a footnote in U.S.-Cuban relations. 
The Project: A New Synthesis 
The “Struggle Against Bandits” itself was a series of confrontations, plots, and 
counterplots that permeated the early years of the revolution, from 1959-1963, that took on the 
attributes of both an ideological and intellectual confrontation and a very real physical 
confrontation. Although the aggression against Cuba did not end in 1963, it was at this point that 
U.S. policy was forced to change after the long string of defeats suffered at the hands of the 
                                                          
17 Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965 (Washington: Potomac 
Books, 2005), p. 1-9. 
7 
Cubans. This thesis argues that this secretive struggle between the two intelligence communities 
and ideological adversaries is of paramount importance in the half-century long history of 
Cuba’s revolution and U.S. Cold War history. These counterrevolutionary clandestine groups 
were consistently unsuccessful in derailing the revolutionary process and their defeats are central 
to understanding the Cuban Cold War and U.S. policy shifts throughout Latin America. In many 
ways, these organizations failed due to their lack of social and political legitimacy. Many of 
these groups claimed to be independent organizations representing the Cuban Exile community 
but were in fact structured from the ground up by the Central Intelligence Agency. Moreover, not 
only did these organizations fail in their overall mission of assassinating Castro and derailing the 
Cuban Revolution, they indirectly aided the Cuban government in consolidating the Revolution. 
In most cases, following attacks on Cuban teachers, work places, and military targets, masses of 
ordinary Cubans flocked to join revolutionary organizations. As Mrs. Velasco commented, most 
of the victims were “just doing an honest day’s work.” The murder of teachers infuriated the 
general public, the burning of cane fields angered the farmers who had just received them, and 
workers were enraged at losing their jobs following the bombing and sabotage of factories. This 
drove many into the revolutionary apparatus and towards resistance to external aggression.18
Cuba’s revolutionary process remains a polarizing and controversial point of contention 
for historians. Though books and articles about the Revolution and its leaders are legion, many 
aspects remain untouched in the overall historiography surrounding what is arguably Latin 
America’s longest lasting revolutionary experiment. Since the triumph of the revolution in 
January of 1959, Washington backed a powerful and active counter-revolution. This counter-
revolution took concentrated and often violent action against the revolutionary process in Cuba 
18 As will be examined later, many of the actions taken by the CIA sponsored counter-revolution included attacks on 
teenage literacy volunteers during the 1961 campaign to end illiteracy on the island. 
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and came to influence domestic U.S. politics and U.S. foreign policy in the region. The counter-
revolution has historically been comprised of groups with differing political views. Some were 
remnants of the deposed Batista regime; others were members of the upper and middle classes 
who initially saw the Revolution as little more than a change of political leadership within a long 
line of coups, or as an opportunity to insert themselves into positions of economic advantage. 
What the organizations had in common was CIA patronage and ties to the U.S. Government. 
Few of them understood or were able to predict the social aspect of Cuba’s revolution and felt 
betrayed by its young, middle and upper-class leaders whom they viewed as class traitors. 
Existing literature tends to view the counter-revolution as a monolithic body of CIA assets, or, 
on the other end of the spectrum, as victims of a revolution that turned against them.19 What is 
less analyzed is what interests they represented and why it was that they opposed the Revolution 
and put themselves at the disposal of U.S. Cold War policy. The scholarly body of literature 
lacks an analysis of the Cuban Revolutionary initiatives and campaigns against the counter-
revolution, as well as the popular reforms that drew the majority of Cubans to the revolutionary 
cause rather than away from it. The former oligarchs, military leaders, and even the middle 
business-class opponents to the Revolution received huge amounts of monetary, logistical, and 
military support from the U.S. State Department as well as the CIA. The odds were stacked 
against the Revolutionaries. How was it that a revolutionary government in its infancy was able 
to consolidate itself and defend against such an advanced network of clandestine intervention 
                                                          
19 Even well-meaning historians whose work deals with little-known aspects of the Cuban Revolution and its 
relations with the United States suffer from a lack of analysis of the counter-revolution. Alex Von Tunzelmann’s 
recent work,  Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean is an interesting look at this period 
across the Caribbean including in Haiti and the Dominican Republic but focuses almost totally on the personalities 
of the leaders in each country. Stephen G. Rabe’s work in his two books Eisenhower and Latin America: The 
Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism and The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America 
rank among the best recent analyses of U.S. intervention in Latin America in this period but once again the narrative 
centers on the halls of power in Washington and the major events of the period like the Bay of Pigs. Missing is an 
in-depth look at the development of the counter-revolution itself and any analysis of Cuban resistance to it that 
would add an important missing element to these works, the Cubans themselves. 
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from its domestic opponents and their benefactors, the most powerful military nation in the 
world? The reality is a fascinating and little understood story.  
This thesis works on two levels. One is as an analysis of this marginalized series of 
events which is vital to building a more accurate picture of the revolution, its opposition, and 
U.S. strategy over the course of the Cold War. Rather than being complimentary to the Bay of 
Pigs and the Missile Crisis, the “Struggle Against Bandits” was a crucial series of events that 
encompassed both. Second, in examining the development of the clandestine struggle, historians 
can more effectively contribute to the scholarship on the revolution’s longevity, and, what is 
more, how the CIA’s use of the Cuban émigré community served as a testing ground for future 
actions across the region over the course of the Cold War.  
This project demonstrates Cuba’s resistance to the counter-revolution and how that 
resistance triggered a change in U.S. policy. Before the Cuban Revolution occurred, the United 
States supported the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and orchestrated the 1954 
coup in Guatemala that ousted the country’s democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz. 
These operations were totally successful from the CIA’s perspective, because they prevented 
moderate nationalist movements from nationalizing resources. Even in the Congo, as late as 
1960, the CIA supported the Belgian and Katangan forces against Patrice Lumumba. Cuba was 
clearly meant to be another successful end to a popular movement. However, the trouble for the 
CIA was that the Cubans succeeded in repelling every invasion and uncovering numerous plots. 
Though sustaining a heavy loss of life and economic damages over the years of struggle, the 
Cuban Revolution survived and is still standing. In response, the CIA and the counter-revolution 
constantly changed tactics, and their strategy evolved over the years. As the United States 
Government took a more interventionist role around the globe post 1963, particularly in the so-
10 
called Third World, the rhetoric became that of “preventing another Cuba.” Cuba, the small 
island nation, had forced the strongest intelligence community and the government that 
supported it to constantly re-evaluate their courses of action. U.S. actions in Vietnam and Sub-
Saharan Africa, as well as in the rest of Latin America, had their roots in the battles against the 
Cuban Revolution. 
Historiography 
The diverse and extensive body of literature that exists across the political spectrum has 
almost universally overlooked the importance of these secret battles. The average general history 
of modern Cuba introduces the clandestine struggle between competing intelligence communities 
as little more than a stepping stone in their overall narrative.20 Where many scholars fall short in
their analysis of these events is in how the “Struggle Against Bandits” is placed in context. The 
conflict between Cuba’s new revolutionary government and its adversaries is almost always 
framed solely through the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or both. These two 
events marked flash-points of this secret war, but the battles, both armed and political, from 1959 
until 1963 constituted a much more complex and often ignored series of events that represent a 
sustained policy of aggression against Cuba on the part of the U.S. Government. Much of the 
literature produced since the 1960s has concentrated on the opposition and the Revolution’s 
responses as simply reactions to the radicalization of the Cuban political climate post 1959.21 In
other words, this is a “chicken or the egg” analysis (the U.S. encroached and the Cuban 
20 Richard Gott’s Cuba: A New History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004,), p. 190-195. and Aviva 
Chomsky’s A History of the Cuban Revolution (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) are very good basic overviews of 
modern Cuban history that are written largely as text books and barely mention a clandestine struggle. Both mention 
very little activity before the Bay of Pigs.  
21 Thomas G. Paterson attempts to analyze the relationship between the Cuban revolutionaries and Washington in 
the days leading up to the Bay of Pigs but follows the fairly traditional pattern of American misunderstanding of 
Cuba and of Castro’s steady radicalization and move towards the Soviet Union. Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting 
Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 
255-263. 
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Revolution radicalized, or vice versa). Missing is an analysis of the reasons why most Cubans 
turned out to combat the counter-revolution rather than join it. What is also missing from the 
historiography of this period in Cuban history is an analysis of the repeated defeat of the efforts 
against the Cuban Revolution that forced major changes upon the strategy of American policy 
makers and had far-reaching effects on their conduct toward Cuba, Latin America and the 
developing world in general for the rest of the twentieth century.  
In the body of scholarly literature, a minuscule number of works focuses specifically on 
the “Struggle Against the Bandits.”  The most important of these is Jesús Arboleya’s The Cuban 
Counter-Revolution.22 Arboleya, a Cuban historian, looks at the evolution of the Cuban 
opposition on the island and its subsequent use as a CIA asset. Arboleya plots the trajectory of 
these clandestine groups from spies to the textbook definition of terrorists in the employ of 
Washington. More importantly, he analyses these groups as the most recent in the long history of 
the Cuban business class, which has traditionally supported foreign intervention on behalf of its 
own class interests, and opposed social restructuring in order to defend their leading role in 
Cuban society and economics.23 In other words, he draws a line from the original sugar-planting 
class and the early annexationists through the captains of industry in the first half of the twentieth 
century, all the way to the Mafia and the Cold War. Arboleya’s book very clearly places the 
counter-revolution in its proper context and accurately describes their patron-client relationship 
with the CIA in a way that offers insight into their motivations. Arboleya and his work are 
interesting in that they are representative of a body Cuban scholarship that is difficult to find 
                                                          
22 Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban Counter-Revolution,(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000). 
23Ibid., p. 1-10. 
12 
published outside of Cuba or Latin America.24 They are representative of the scholarship that is
largely ignored by their counterparts in the U.S. and outside of the Americas. 
Equally important is the work of Don Bohning, formerly of the Miami Herald. His book, 
The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965, is a narrative history 
from the internal perspective of the CIA and its Miami-based allies.25 The book centers on the
inner workings of the CIA at the time and its relationship with the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. It is filled with declassified documents and first-hand accounts from former 
operatives involved in offensive operations during the heyday of assassination attempts against 
Castro as well as armed activity in the central zone of Cuba. This book exposes recently 
discovered information on how the CIA organized itself and carried out Washington’s policy of 
subversion of the Cuban Revolution. Though not overly sympathetic to the revolution, this book 
does criticize the conduct of the U.S. Government’s secret war. Bohning’s book is filled with 
personal interviews with agents who had remained silent for decades. Through his interviews, 
Bohning was able to chart the evolution of the secret war against Cuba through the lens of 
shifting political climates in Washington and Miami.  Bohning’s work on the Miami side of the 
conflict will be compared to and analyzed alongside the work of Fabian Escalante of Cuban 
Intelligence. 
 Fabian Escalante was at the center of the events in question. While Bohning was a 
journalist covering the secret war, Escalante was a participant, and is today one of the foremost 
24 Due to the U.S. trade embargo and the infrequent granting of U.S. travel visas for Cuban scholars to visit the 
United States, engagement is rare outside of international conferences outside of either country. The trade embargo 
often prevents U.S. publishers and vendors from being able to obtain work by Cuban scholars. 
25 Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965 (Washington: Potomac 
Books, 2005), p. 1-9. 
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historians on the subject.26 Unlike his counterparts in the U.S., Escalante and those from within 
the Cuban intelligence community are anything but quiet about events during this period. In his 
three volume work beginning with The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations 1959-62, 
Escalante provides the other counterpart to Bohning’s work. Escalante discussed measures taken 
by the revolutionary government to remain abreast of external threats. Escalante’s trilogy focuses 
on what are seen in Cuba as the three main aspects of the secret war. The first book deals with 
the CIA’s generalized actions against the Cuban Revolution and Cuba’s responses.27 The second 
volume centers specifically on what would become known by the CIA as Operation Mongoose, 
which concentrated specifically on the assassination of Cuban leaders, Fidel Castro in 
particular.28 Escalante’s final book puts forth the theory with evidence that the apparatus of 
Operation Mongoose eventually tuned on its creators in 1963 with the assassination of President 
Kennedy.29 Though this project does not deal directly with the Pandora’s Box of the Kennedy 
assassination, this book is valuable in building an understanding of the complex and far-reaching 
program of assassination.   
Luis A. Pérez is a name that constantly presents itself in almost any study involving 
Cuba, since his work is so often used as the most basic introduction to the history of Cuba since 
the nineteenth century. For the purposes of this study, Pérez’s book, Cuba in the American 
                                                          
26 Fabian Escalante was a student activist and political prisoner of Fulgencio Batista. Following his release after the 
victory of the revolution, he joined the newly formed state intelligence agency. He rose through the ranks to become 
one of the heads of Cuban security, and between 1976 and 1982 he was the head of the Minisrty, of the Interior. 
Escalante was in charge of Cuba’s investigation into the Kennedy assassination when the case was reopened in 
1978. He is today viewed as one of the world’s premier experts on the CIA. Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: 
CIA Covert Operations 1959-62 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004), p.i. 
27 Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations 1959-62 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004). 
28 Fabian Escalante, Executive Action: 634 Ways To Kill Fidel Castro (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2006). 
29 Fabian Escalante, JFK: The Cuba Files- The Untold Story of the Plot to Kill Kennedy (Sydney: Ocean books, 
2006). 
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Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos is well worth comment.30 Though centered well 
before the era of the Cuban Revolution, Pérez goes to great lengths to describe how the United 
States Government has seen Cuba since the time of Jefferson. Pérez describes a near psychosis 
within the ranks of the U.S. Government, which was obsessed with dominating and exploiting 
Cuba long before its Cold War obsession with assassinating Cuba’s leaders and destroying its 
revolutionary experiment. In essence, Pérez asserts that the U.S. and its business interests reacted 
strongly to the Cuba simply for its assertion of sovereignty, and would have done so during the 
post-1959 period regardless of its leaders’ radicalization. Through the use of newspapers and 
political cartoons, especially from the period just before the war of 1898, Pérez charts the 
evolution of perceptions of Cuba from inside the U.S. It is with the help of Pérez that this project 
is able to place Cuba’s struggle for sovereignty within the “long nineteenth century” rather than 
simply confining it to the Cold War. 
To supplement this, the work of Greg Grandin in his book Empire’s Workshop has 
proved invaluable.31 Grandin places the Cuban counter-revolution within the greater scheme of 
U.S. interventionism in Latin America. According to Grandin, the counter-revolutionary groups 
both used and were used by Washington as both strove to reach their own political and social 
goals.  While many historians who focus primarily on the international relations aspect of this 
period as well as scholars of the dynamics of “great power politics” gloss over U.S. actions in the 
name of political realism, Grandin and, to a great degree, Stephen Rabe (mentioned earlier) both 
place the U.S. in a long line of empires, and they are not swayed by post-Cold War 
triumphalism. This small list of books makes up the majority of work dealing with the 
                                                          
30 Luis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2011). 
31 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, The United States, And The Rise of The New Imperialism 
(new York: Metropolitan books, 2006) 
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clandestine struggle as a complex series of waves rather than as a footnote to the “great power” 
policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They bolster this project’s objective of analyzing the 
development of the “Struggle Against Bandits,” the defeat of the counter-revolution, and this 
conflict’s role in shaping U.S. policy in the developing world in the following decades.  
Methodology 
In order to create a new synthesis it has been necessary in this project to bring together 
these secondary sources that are part of an international scholarship that rarely meet. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Though Cuba has a number of foreign language presses and there are 
a few scholars who deal with the “Struggle Against Bandits,” these works are difficult to obtain 
in the United States. On the opposite end of the spectrum, books by U.S.-based scholars with 
access to declassified CIA materials, like Bohning, for example, are difficult to obtain in Cuba. 
There are gaps that must be addressed in order to create a new synthesis on this topic. This is one 
of the most important aspects of this thesis.  Alongside these few select important works of 
secondary literature, this project will make use of a number of never before used primary 
sources.  Among these sources are the communiqués and correspondence of the Comandos 
Mambíses. This organization, in its day, was among the best funded and most successful of all of 
the counter-revolutionary organizations based in Miami. Its members carried out a number of 
actions and claimed to lack a political or economic motive other than eliminating the growing 
socialist movement within Cuba. The Commandos claimed that they were self-organized and 
self-funded in an attempt to create an aura of legitimacy in “reclaiming the revolution.” The 
Commandos lacked popular support, as did most of the other organizations, and this, along with 
faulty strategies forged in Washington, led directly to their defeat and disbanding by 1963. The 
Commandos serve as an interesting and unknown microcosm of the entire clandestine war 
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between the CIA-sponsored counter-revolution and the newly formed Cuban intelligence 
services who, without training, were able to keep the CIA at bay. 
Personal conversations with Cuban representatives who were present and took part in 
these events inform the analysis. Dr. Manuel Yepe, of the University of Havana, graciously 
agreed to converse about the evolution of the Cuban Revolution as well as Cuban attempts to 
repel efforts by the CIA and the counter-revolution to derail it. Dr. Yepe is today a professor of 
foreign affairs at the University of Havana. During the period in question, he went from being a 
capable student revolutionary in the urban underground of the 26th of July Movement to head of
protocol for the new revolutionary government. Dr. Yepe has had a very unique career at the side 
of some of the revolution’s leaders, and he participated actively in the changes taking place in 
Cuban society at the time. These conversations with the author, conducted over the previous 
three years in Havana, have been invaluable to this project. An extensive survey of the body of 
literature on this period, the Comandos Mambíses papers, and the author’s lengthy conversations 
with Dr. Yepe complement each other. 
This work will be divided into three parts, each analyzing a different aspect of the 
political and armed maneuverings that led directly to the state of Cuban-U.S. relations seen 
throughout the Cold War, most of which continue today. Though the roots of these problems can 
be found long before 1959, it was the period of 1959-63 that changed the power relations 
between the two nations and had a profound impact on the Caribbean, Latin America, and the 
Cold War in general. The revolutionary leadership and its Washington and Miami-based 
adversaries were the key players in that development. 
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The first section provides an overview of the revolutionary seizure of power, the 
leadership, and the reforms enacted in the early days of the revolution, just after the 1959 victory 
over Batista. No understanding of what developed later can be divorced from these reforms. Of 
particular importance are the Agrarian and Urban Reform laws, the revolutionary tribunals, and 
the formation of the National Revolutionary Militias (MNRs) and the Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). This section argues that the militias and CDRs were among 
the main deciding factors in the outcome of the armed struggle against the CIA assets. A reading 
of available Cuban Government documents addressing these reforms will provide a framework 
for analysis of the larger ideological struggle that was taking place. A clear picture emerges from 
these reforms that discards the myth of a population of victims and simple followers beholden to 
Castro. What will be seen are the very real popular and grass-roots reforms that took place in 
Cuba as well as how they drew ordinary Cubans into the struggle and gave them a stake in 
defending the revolution. It was these men and women who would be the historiographically 
unsung deciding factors in the defeat of the counter-revolution. Likewise, this section will 
examine the beginnings of the battle between the economic interests of the U.S. and its émigré 
allies, and those of the Cuban state. The reader will see the battle lines being drawn and be given 
a window onto how a political and economic conflict became both an overt and covert conflict 
that included sabotage, subversion, misinformation, intimidation, and sabotage. 
The second portion of the project looks deeply into the actions and organization of the 
counter-revolution from 1960 until its defeat at Playa Gíron (the Bay of Pigs Invasion). What 
was going on in the upper echelons of Cuban society when the revolution took power, and what 
actions did they take to retain control of their assets? Where did the CIA stand in the final days 
before 1959? At what point did the CIA and the opposition begin to take action against the 
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reforms? It is here that we will first be introduced to Rafael Martínez Pupo, who was 
representative of the supporters of the counter-revolution. It was Martínez who would come to be 
the founder of the Comandos Mambíses, and it is through this organization that we will see the 
shift in counter-revolutionary strategy from what is called the “controlled period” of CIA activity 
(1959 until mid-1960), to invasion in early 1961, and eventually on to what is known as the 
“autonomous operational period” which lasted until November of 1963. 
The third section analyses the period of “autonomous action” leading up until the end of 
the 1962 October Missile Crisis. The activities of the Commandos will be analyzed to understand 
how they were representative of the changing tide of CIA activity. This section will conclude 
with the final defeat of the last counter-revolutionary bands in central Cuba as well as the 
removal of funding from the majority of organizations bringing the “Struggle Against Bandits” 
to a close in 1963. This section of the study discusses the beginning of the Johnson 
Administration and what this meant for the anti-Castro movements. 
The project will conclude with an overall review of the “Struggle Against Bandits” and 
how the resistance of ordinary Cubans changed the face of U.S. interventionist policy. The trends 
and strategies of clandestine U.S. operations in the Third World, within the context of the post-
1959 Cold War, were first formulated to combat Cuba’s Revolution. Interestingly, the same 
personalities involved in the actions against Cuba continued to make their presences felt time and 
again, especially later in U.S. policy, and in terrorist activity in Cuba and the United States. Cuba 
has legitimately battled against the ongoing threat of terrorism and had been doing so long before 
the “War on Terror,” with all of its connotations, entered the global mindset post 9/11/ 2001. It 
seems that the more independent Cuba fought to become, the less rationally its large neighbor 
has reacted to it. The more independence Cuba asserts for itself politically, the less 
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independently U.S. foreign policy is carried out as the elders of the counter-revolution still hold a 
monopoly on popular discourse in the U.S. regarding Cuba. Miami gradually acquired its own 
foreign policy which continues to operate even today. All of these competing dynamics can be 
linked to the dramatic and often overlooked “Struggle Against Bandits.” 
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Chapter 1 
 
From the Sierra Maestra to Power: the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution 
 
All Eyes Were On Us 
 
“On January 1, 1959, many people thought they had stepped into a world of 
riches. What they had really done was to win the opportunity to start creating- in 
the midst of underdevelopment, poverty, ignorance and misery- the wealth and 
well-being of the future.”32 
Fidel Castro 
 
 Sitting in a bright living room in Havana’s tree-lined Vedado neighborhood, a 
revolutionary remembered where he was on January 1st 1959 in a conversation over coffee. The 
years had done nothing to fog his memories of the most important events of his life. “Everything 
was happening faster than we expected,” he said. Santa Clara had just fallen to Column 8, and 
the Rebel Army was already on its way from Las Villas through Matanzas and then on to the 
capital.33 He remembers that, “once we heard over Radio Rebelde the call for the general strike, 
we took to the streets.”34 It was the first time the student revolutionaries were able to openly 
                                                          
32 Fidel Castro, quoted in Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1969), p. 1. 
33 Santa Clara is the third largest city in Cuba and was the setting of the final major battle of the armed struggle to 
overthrow the Batista dictatorship. Column 8 was the armed guerilla unit under the command of Che Guevara that 
captured the city. 
34 When the news that Batista had fled the island in the early morning hours of New Year’s Day 1959, Fidel Castro 
and the rebel leadership issued the call for a massive and long awaited general strike that would bring the nation to a 
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carry their weapons and wear their 26th of July armbands on the streets. It was New Year’s Day 
1959, and Mr. Yepe was only a young student. Where most young people his age in other parts 
of the world would be finishing their studies, his generation had the revolution. “That was my 
university experience. It is what we had fought so hard to create.” The next morning Yepe 
received a call from the advancing rebel column at the general post office where he had stationed 
himself. The raspy voice on the other end asked if everything was going well where he was and 
told him that there were nearly a thousand government troops wanting to surrender just outside 
of town. “He told me that I was the most senior man on site, so it was me that had to negotiate 
the surrender. I only had a handful of people. How were we, just college kids with some light 
arms who had no experience in politics going to negotiate the surrender of uniformed soldiers 
who were just hours before, out to kill us?”  There was no one else and the persistent, raspy 
voice was ordering Yepe to take charge.35 Though they would later become close friends and 
colleagues, that was his first introduction to Comandante Che Guevara, and for both of them, this 
day was a transformative one.36 
  This was a watershed moment in Cuban history. For the first time, a militant generation 
of young Cubans had overthrown a corrupt government by force of arms and were triumphantly 
entering the capital. For the first time, a revolutionary movement was taking power, not being 
co-opted and or driven back by military coup. It was Che Guevara, a young man of thirty at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
halt and prevent a coup during the power vacuum. The strike mobilized all sectors of the revolutionary underground 
in the cities and prevented a second seizure of power on the part of the military. 
35 Dr. Manuel Yepe had been a member of the 26th of July Movement’s underground in Havana. After having his 
cover blown in late 1958 he was sent to Matanzas City about three hours east of Havana on Cuba’s northern coast. 
There he was in charge of organizing a new clandestine cell and was there on January 1st 1959. After the 
mobilization and capture of the key points in the city, he was ordered by Che Guevara, whose column was 
approaching on the central highway, ordered Yepe to take some of his fellow activists and negotiate the surrender of 
the large contingent of government troops stationed outside the city. After doing this he returned to Havana during 
the rebel entrance into the capital.  
36 Dr. Manuel Yepe, Notes from conversation with author, Havana Cuba. July 2012.  
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time, who may have articulated it best when he said that at that moment, “we represented the 
hopes and dreams of an unredeemed America. The eyes of the oppressors and those of the 
oppressed were fixed on us.”37 What he meant was that the revolutionary victory was unexpected 
for many, and that there was a new responsibility placed upon the shoulders of the Cuban 
revolutionaries. They had done something that had not been done before in Cuba or for much of 
Latin American history. It was their responsibility to carry the revolution forward and defend it. 
 Crowds lined both sides of Havana’s malecón. It was January 8th 1959, a week after 
Batista’s flight, and Havana had only recently been secured by the rebel army columns.38 This 
was the day in which the so-called “Freedom Caravan” of the main body of the Rebel Army was 
finally entering Havana with Fidel Castro, the rebel hero of the younger generation, at its head. 
Castro was welcomed by the largest crowds Havana had ever seen. The changes promised by the 
rebel leadership were lightning fast in their inception. Within days Cuba was changing, 
confirming the idea that this was a “real revolution.” This was not simply a change of political 
leaders, but the beginning of important structural changes that would shift the political climate 
from one of gangsterism to something new. Over the course of the week it took Castro to march 
to the capital in the victory caravan, he spoke to multitudes in every municipality. Again and 
again he told the crowds that this was not 1898, it was not 1933, and that there would be no 
going backwards to politiquería.39 
                                                          
37 Ernesto Che Guevara, Remanisances of the Cuban Revolutionary War (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2006), p273-
274. 
38 On January 1st the columns of the rebel army under the command of Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos entered 
the city while members of the revolutionary underground rose up with the general strike to take key parts of the 
capital. Guevara and Column 8 took command of La Cabaña Fortress, and Camilo Cienfuegos’s unit took command 
of Camp Colombia, the largest military base in Cuba which is just outside of the city. 
39 In 1898 the rebels who had been fighting for decades to free Cuba from Spanish colonialism were subverted by 
the invasion of the United States military which led directly to the semi-colonial status that Cuba was subjected to in 
the twentieth century. Castro’s reference to 1933 is based upon the popular protests that ended the presidency of 
political strongman Gerardo Machado but was subverted by the ambitions of Batista, with U.S. backing. 
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Within twenty one months the revolutionary government instituted earthshaking reforms 
that not only changed the political landscape of Cuba but made immediate enemies in both 
Washington and on Wall Street. The most important of these reforms charted a course for the 
Cuban Revolution that would be seen as irreconcilable with U.S. strategic interests and the 
economic status of the island’s elites. It would be these forces that would mobilize themselves to 
first take economic action against the new government, and eventually try to destroy it. The 
reforms included tribunals for the most violent and repressive officers and representatives of the 
former regime, a move toward universal housing, a renegotiation of foreign relations, and, 
arguably most importantly, land reform. The process put in motion would lead to the 
strengthening of revolutionary resolve on the island and create the conditions for the “Struggle 
against Bandits.” The distinct battle lines were drawn very early. What were these far reaching 
reforms enacted by the young government that would compel counter-revolution and its backers 
in Washington to take action so soon after the triumph of a popular revolutionary movement? 
Revolutionary Justice 
In the first months after Batista’s flight, rebels and citizens began to arrest the most 
highly accused of the former regime’s henchmen. They were high-ranking military officers 
accused of war crimes, police officers accused of torture and repression, and government 
officials accused of embezzling public funds. The prisoners were held in the Cabaña Fortress and 
in other municipal garrisons across the island as evidence was gathered and their victims and 
families of victims sent for. Throughout the first half of 1959, the trials were massive events 
drawing hundreds of thousands and prompting demonstrations of millions in support of the 
tribunals. Immediately condemned in the United States as “show trials” due to the fact that some 
of the most important proceedings were open to the public and televised, these trials were a 
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political necessity for the new government.40 The crimes of the Batista years were many in
number and there was a massive public outcry for justice. Justice itself was one of the pillars of 
the political platform of the 26th of July Movement. From the earliest days in the Sierra Maestra,
Castro had promised the public that the political gangsters of the Batista regime would have to 
answer for their crimes. Witnesses, victims, and the families of victims were allowed to face the 
defendants and accuse them directly. Defendants were by most accounts well treated and allowed 
defense counsel and witnesses in their favor as most criminal trials in much of the world would 
call for.41
Though condemned in the United States, these trials met with massive public approval in 
Cuba, and when the Eisenhower Administration issued criticisms of the trials, crowds of up to 
one million took to the streets outside the U.S. embassy in Havana to demonstrate in favor of the 
tribunals. Historian Michelle Chase, in her recent essay on the tribunals, asserts that these trials 
have often been used to demonstrate the consolidation of power on the part of the Revolutionary 
Government; little is said of the legitimacy of these trials in the body of literature.42 The
proceedings served to highlight the crimes of the Batistanos and juxtapose them with the fair 
treatment of prisoners at the hands of the rebels both during and after the armed struggle. There 
40 The first of the major trials was that of Jesús Sosa Blanco, a particularly unpopular military officer who was head 
of Batista’s army in Holguin Province in eastern Cuba. The trial took place on January 13th 1959. Sosa Blanco was 
tried in the Havana sports stadium, and the event was open to the public. His accusers faced him and were able to 
accuse him directly. He was convicted for the torture and murder of peasants as well as the destruction of homes. He 
admitted to his crimes and showed little remorse. He was shot days later. The trial immediately came under criticism 
from the Eisenhower administration. Castro and the rebel leadership eventually put a stop to the public trials, as the 
justice system we reformed, but despite the condemnation abroad, there were more than 500,000 pro-trial 
demonstrators outside the stadium for the Sosa Blanco trial alone. The political, social and strategic necessity is the 
subject of Michelle Chase’s recent article on the trials published in a compilation of essays dealing with the “Long 
Cold War in Latin America.” Michelle Chase, “The Trials,” A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and 
Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin America’s Long Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press 2010). 
41 Dayan Jayatilleka, Fidel’s Ethics of Violence: The Moral Dimension of the Political Thought of Fidel Castro 
(London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 92-96. 
42 Michelle Chase, “The Trials,” A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin 
America’s Long Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 163-164. 
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was a strict policy in the conduct of the armed struggle against Batista that there would be no 
torture of captured solders. This was a policy that was continued beyond the victory of the armed 
struggle and has been maintained in Cuba. Also important to discuss is that following moments 
of upheaval, Cuba had a history of mob violence. Dr. Manuel Yepe of the University of Havana 
points out that Cubans remembered the 1930s, where following the ousting of the dictatorship of 
Gerardo Machado, there was no attempt by the new government to bring justice against the old 
regime in an orderly fashion. Angry mobs roamed the streets attacking the criminals of the 
Machado administration, and many were killed.43 According to Yepe, if the revolutionary
tribunals proved anything, it was that the 26th of July Movement of 1959 was very much
concerned with not only justice, but maintaining public order. According to Yepe, the rebels 
wanted to prove to the people that they would bring the gangsters to justice, but they did not 
want to revert to mob violence. In their revolution there would be no lynching.44 Revolutionary
justice was, in this analysis, swift and resolute, but fair, without excess bloodshed. In essence, 
the tribunals served multiple purposes. They were an almost cathartic way for Cuban society to 
exorcize the demons of the Batista regime and begin anew. Likewise, they effectively held back 
the tidal wave of mob violence that could have taken place had there been no trials, as had 
occurred in the past.45 From the perspective of the new government, the people would have taken
justice into their own hands, and it was the duty and responsibility of the new government to do 
this in a responsible way. The political importance of the executions of those convicted of torture 
and murder proved to the population that justice would come and that there was no going back.46
43 The single best work readily available on the 1933 uprising against Machado is Luis Aguilar, Cuba 1933: 
Prologue to Revolution (New York: Norton, 1974). 
44 Manuel Yepe, Conversation with author, Havana Cuba. July 2012 
45 Michelle Chase, “The Trials,” A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin 
America’s Long Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p.178-180. 
46 C. Wright Mills, Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960), p. 12-22. 
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Beyond this, the tribunals were also a unique form of popular participation in the revolution 
itself. The leadership called upon the public to face their former oppressors and in making the 
proceedings accessible to the public, there was a sense of participation in the process of justice 
rather than the new state exacting justice behind closed doors. The tribunals brought closure and 
utilized violence sparingly despite the American propaganda of the day which continues to play a 
decisive role in how Cuba is portrayed to the American public to this day.47 
 In the halls of power in Washington, these trials did not bode well. Many of 
Washington’s former intelligence assets were on trial, and the general consensus on Wall Street 
was that these feisty young rebel leaders lacked respect for previous arrangements fostered over 
a long history of close relationship between the U.S. business class and friendly regimes in 
Havana.48 For many in the Cuban upper-classes, as well as those who had a colder attitude 
toward the revolution, these trials were a very real threat to their existence. Members of the 
conservative middle class who were simply expecting a change of political leadership rather than 
very real exacting of justice upon the old order rejected the trials as showpieces of repression and 
portrayed them as a near holocaust.49 This notion overlooked the very real crimes that had been 
committed at the hands of Batista’s forces. Political activists had been tortured and murdered in 
the cities by police and organized criminal elements with links to the government, and army 
officers had been responsible for the murder of peasants, rebel prisoners, and the forced 
                                                          
47 Michelle Chase, “The Trials,” A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin 
America’s Long Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p.170-188. 
48 Philip Agee, former CIA Cuba station chief, Interview in Estella Bravo’s documentary, Fidel: the Untold Story, 
2003. 
49 Time Magazine, for example, in its February 2, 1959 edition, ran an article comparing the trials with a “Roman 
Coliseum,” and there were descriptions of the “bloodbath executions.” These interpretations by the media added to 
the bitterness of the Cuban émigré community moving to Miami and have come to be accepted images of the 
tribunals. To this day there are a host of websites and independent publications that produce articles on the “Cuban 
Holocaust.”  Some examples are the Cuban American National Foundation or canf.org, the Cuban Freedom Project, 
and therealcuba.com. Though most of these are  far from scholarly, they maintain a large base of readers among 
conservative Cuban émigrés across different generations as well as enjoy a great deal of acceptance from the 
American public that has been given a steady dose flawed history for fifty four years. 
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relocation of farmers. Homes in the countryside had been burned, and the list of crimes during 
the Batista regime was long. 
 In a very real sense, these tribunals were an opening salvo for the political and physical 
battles to come. Many who escaped before being sent to trial moved directly to Miami and 
incorporated themselves into a growing community of middle-and upper-class Cuban citizens 
who would leave Cuba until what they saw as a short-lived revolutionary process came to an 
end. Arguably the greatest byproduct of the tribunals outside of Cuba, where they were met with 
support, was mythmaking. The number of executions has been the subject of great debate since 
the trials themselves. For critics of the revolutionary government, the numbers of executions run 
well into the thousands. Much of the popular image of these trials in the U.S. are of them being 
extrajudicial in nature and little more than a way for the new government to eliminate enemies.50 
Though the trials played a role in the consolidation of the rebels’ power, there was never 
anything secret about the tribunals. Fidel Castro and the rest of the revolutionary leadership from 
the very beginning presented the trials openly and rejected all criticisms of them from outside 
Cuba. For supporters of the revolution, the criticisms from Washington and Miami were 
irrelevant as they were infringing upon Cuban sovereignty. The real numbers of executions and 
prison sentences are in reality, comparatively much lower than those of other revolutionary 
seizures of power. The public was called upon to help the rebel army round up war criminals, 
and within the first few weeks after January 1, 1959, nearly 6,000 prisoners were being held in 
garrisons across the island, around 600 of which were held at the Cabaña.51 By the end of the 
tribunals, nearly 600 people had been convicted of crimes and executed. A number of others 
                                                          
50 Grayston L. Lynch, Descision for Disaster: The Battle of the Bay of Pigs (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), p.13-
15. 
51 Michelle Chase, “The Trials,” A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin 
America’s Long Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) p. 163-165. 
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received long prison terms. What is regularly forgotten outside of Cuba is that a great deal more 
were found not guilty and released to rejoin society or were free to leave.52 
 Finally, for the new government, the revolutionary tribunals were necessary, from the 
standpoint of defensive strategy. Revolutionary leaders like Castro and Guevara had witnessed 
reform movements and rebellions meet their goals only to be subverted and destroyed for not 
bringing violent counter-revolutionaries to justice, or because they did not create the apparatuses 
to ensure the defense of their respective governments. A perfect example of this was the 1954 
overthrow of reformis president Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala.53 Guevara was in Guatemala 
during the coup against Arbenz and had seen firsthand what could happen if a revolution was 
unprepared to defend itself. The revolutionary tribunals were seen as a necessity in not only 
bringing Batistano war criminals to justice, but in neutralizing those most likely to attempt to 
reverse the revolution. Though far from the absolute bloodbath of counter-revolutionary claims, 
the opening shots of a new struggle had been fired, and the new Cuban government began to face 
opposition from both the U.S. government and their contacts in the émigré community in Miami. 
 Agrarian and Urban Reform 
 Arguably the most important reform enacted by the revolutionary government in its first 
year in power, if not in the entirety of the revolutionary process up until the present, was the 
Agrarian Reform Law signed into action on May 17th 1959 at the former guerilla headquarters in 
                                                          
52 Dr. Manuel Yepe mentioned a case of a neighbor of his who was a barber and was accused of informing on the 
student underground during the armed struggle. The neighbor fled the country, and he returned upon the insistence 
of his family that if he was innocent he would return and face the charges. He was found not guilty and promptly 
released. Manuel Yepe, Conversation with author, Havana, Cuba, November 2013. 
53 Arbenz was elected president on a platform of land reform in Guatemala. Far from radical, Arbenz pledged to 
return much of Guatemala’s land to its farmers and renegotiate commerce with the United States that would be more 
beneficial to Guatemala. This was unacceptable to Washington and Wall Street. Within a short time, with the help of 
the CIA and reactionary members of Guatemala’s military, Arbenz was overthrown. 
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the Sierra Maestra at La Plata.54 The signing of the reform in the mountains was symbolic of the
fulfillment of the first promise of the Rebel Army which was to ensure that Cuba’s lands would 
be returned to those who had worked them for so long. For campesinos this moment was the 
culmination of a long struggle, and for idealists who looked to Cuba’s past of foreign domination 
it was a true milestone in Cuban history. The agrarian reform served not only to solidify support 
for the revolution among farmers, it was also a supreme act of defiance toward foreign business 
interests and a reaffirmation of Cuba’s national sovereignty. 
Historically, Cuba’s farmland was owned almost in its totality by foreign entities whether 
Spanish colonial authorities, the planter class, or American multinational corporations like the 
United Fruit Company. From the perspective of Cuban revolutionaries, Cuba’s peasants had 
never been allowed to work their own land for their own people because it was always done for 
the benefit of outsiders. Before the agrarian reform a tiny minority of landowners possessed the 
majority of Cuba’s arable land. In the vast majority of cases, these massive landholdings were 
owned by Cuban sugar barons and planters who either owned the land as wealthy families or as 
middlemen to foreign firms.55 The majority of the prime farmlands were owned by U.S.
companies, United Fruit being the largest and wealthiest.56 Sugar production was the main
emphasis of the economy in Cuba at the time, and massive fortunes were made from the Cuban 
sugar quota which was sold almost exclusively to the U.S. market. 
54 La Plata was the site of the main headquarters of the Rebel Army beginning in mid-1957. It was from here that 
Castro directed actions against the Batista dictatorship. It is not the purpose of this project to delve deeply into the 
inner workings and statistics of the revolutionary state. For effective and simple breakdowns of the statistical 
information regarding Cuban agriculture before and after the Agrarian Refrom Law see, Jorge Ibarra’s Prologue to 
Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958 (London: Lynn Reinner, 1998), George Lambie, The Cuban Revolution in the Twenty 
First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2010),and  Helen Yaffe, Che Guevara: The Economics of Revolution (London: 
Pelgrave and Macmillan, 2009).   
55 Antoni Kapcia, Cuba in Revolution: A History Since the Fifties (London: Reakton Books, 2008), p. 53-55. 
56 Jorge Ibarra, Prologue to Revolution (London: Lynn Rienner, 1998), p. 69-82. 
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 The lives of farmers and agrarian laborers before 1959 ranked among the most difficult in 
the country. Like their counterparts all over the Americas, in most cases they did not own the 
land on which they lived and worked. The land upon which their very subsistence often 
depended was normally owned by absentee corporations (American and Spanish in the case of 
Cuba), or wealthy Cuban conglomerate managers. Many of Cuba’s campesinos were 
sharecroppers (more than 150,000), and over 200,000 were were totally landless and worked 
either as migrant labor or remained unemployed until harvest season which elevated the rural 
unemployment rate to extremely high levels.57 The 1940s and 50s in Cuba are regularly 
romanticized as a jazz infused, glamorous period. Havana was a bustling metropolis that was the 
envy of Latin America, and the national economy enjoyed stellar growth.58 These things were 
and continue to be emphasized by critics of the Cuban Revolution, but they overlook the reality 
of daily life for the majority of Cuba’s population, particularly in the rural areas of the country, 
as Cuban economic development primarily benefited the urban upper classes.59 
 The initial agrarian reform law limited land holdings to 402 hectares. It immediately 
made farmers and sharecroppers of small and medium size the owners of the land they worked, 
and this went for the landless peasants and day laborers as well. Large landholdings were divided 
up and distributed free of rent payments or purchases. This redistribution of land was met with 
widespread support from poor farmers and almost total condemnation from the planter class and 
the U.S. companies. INRA, or the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, was created to manage 
the redistribution of land, and it sent trained agronomists to the countryside in an attempt to 
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better instruct the former day laborers and sharecroppers how to gain better crop yields.60 
Sharecroppers and migrant laborers were encouraged to form cooperatives to increase 
productivity and technical knowledge.61 
 Though the purposes of this study are not to describe at length the inner workings of the 
INRA, or the crop yields and sugar production, it must be emphasized that INRA and the reform 
in general solidified support for the revolution in the farming communities.62 How does it play 
into the greater theme of counter-revolution and responses on the part of the revolutionary 
government? The Agrarian Reform was the second break with the past that the Cuban 
Revolution undertook. The initial land expropriations were carried through with compensation in 
the form of long-term bonds for the absentee and local owners of massive agricultural holdings. 
This infuriated United Fruit’s board of directors as well the domestic Cuban planter class who 
rejected the distribution of land as well as the offers of compensation. Criticisms of the Agrarian 
Reform Law were just as swift as those leveled at the revolutionary tribunals. Castro and his 
government were, according to U.S. companies, showing a blatant disregard for what they saw as 
their property.63 In essence, the rebel government’s reply was simply that the land was the 
physical representation of Cuba in its purest sense, and that land should belong to its people. This 
very nationalist sentiment was tantamount to heresy in Latin America at this time from the 
perspective of the U.S. government and business interests. In 1954, reactionary elements 
overthrew the Arbenz government in Guatemala for a less radical proposal of agrarian reform. 
Agrarian reform, regardless of how radical or moderate, was seen as a declaration of war by the 
oligarchies that ruled most of the Americas, and Cuba was no different in this regard. Within 
                                                          
60 Luis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 320-323. 
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weeks of the reform being enacted, there were calls out of Wall Street and their Cuban business 
partners for action.64 Initial urban reforms were met with similar support from a broad portion of
the Cuban public.65 By mid-1959, the rents of city dwellers were slashed in half and the amount
of urban real-estate that one could own was reduced, effectively breaking the monopoly that a 
select few held on urban housing.66 Thousands of Cubans, who had been renting for decades,
received deeds to the locations in which they were currently living, effectively doubling Cuba’s 
home ownership rates by the end of 1960. The Urban Reform took place in stages that lasted 
until 1965, but it was the initial wave of mandated rent reductions and property nationalizations 
that first frustrated landlords and urban industrialists, many of whom emigrated and joined 
counter-revolutionary organizations.67
The agrarian and urban reforms would soon be accompanied by other extremely popular 
structural changes such as the adoption of universal healthcare and education for all Cubans. 
These reforms, based on ideas of social justice, not only provided the majority of Cuban society 
with access to services they had never received before, they also inspired an ever increasing 
sense of loyalty toward the process on the part of working-class Cubans, especially within the 
Afro-Cuban population who had been living under Jim Crow conditions.68 This being said, with
each radical reform, more and more of the conservative members of the middle class began to 
leave Cuba and join their wealthy counterparts in Miami. The rhetoric of the revolutionary 
government strengthened their fears, and their own rhetoric increased its reactionary tone. Critics 
of the Cuban Revolution and political adversaries of the process today almost constantly look 
64 Jack Colhoun, Gangsterismo: The United States, Cuba, and the Mafia: 1933 to 1966 (New York: OR Books, 
2013), p.61-71. 
65 Luis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 319, 365-
366. 
66 Antoni Kapcia, Cuba in Revolution: A History Since the Fifties (London: Reakton Books, 2008), p. 46-52. 
67 Luis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.320-336. 
68 Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 50-53. 
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back at these reforms through the lens “what the revolution took from people.” More often than 
not, especially within the United States, the revolutionary reforms are typically seen as an almost 
random and malicious theft of “private property” with little cause and recourse. This choice of 
lenses through which to view these events is one factor that helped lead to the political 
confrontation that came to a head by early 1960. It would also help motivate reactionaries to try 
and subvert the revolution which was, after these reforms, at the height if its popularity. What 
many often fail to see, or refuse to recognize, is that the majority of Cuban citizens at that point 
in time, rather than having things taken from them, actually received benefits from the 
revolution.69 Peasants received deeds to land of their own for the first time. People’s rent was
slashed if not eliminated as housing became a right guaranteed by the state. Wages were raised 
for many. Access to education, healthcare, sport and culture would help create a new Cuban 
identity that was based on resistance to aggression, and gave ordinary Cubans a stake in the 
revolution. These reforms helped create a society conscious of itself and ready to defend the 
gains it had made up to that point. 
Battle Lines Drawn 
The trials and reforms were watched very closely in Washington. Just weeks after the 
revolutionary victory, Fidel Castro traveled to the United States on a public relations visit. Castro 
sought to meet with President Eisenhower to renegotiate Cuba’s relationship with the United 
States, and to attempt to create an atmosphere of respectful understanding between the two 
leaders. Insults to Castro and the Revolutionary Government were quick in coming. Eisenhower 
went out for a round of golf rather than meeting with the young revolutionary, instead leaving 
69 Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban Counter-Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000), 
p. 43-49.
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the rendezvous to his Vice President Richard Nixon.70 Nixon met with Castro for an hour. After 
the meeting, Nixon informed Eisenhower and his presidential advisors that Castro was dangerous 
and needed to be overthrown.71 From that moment forward, plans were drawn on Eisenhower 
and Nixon’s orders to overthrow Castro and derail the Cuban Revolution. The CIA set to work 
straight away. 
 By 1960, in the wake of the Agrarian Reform Law and the revolutionary trials, 
Washington had lost patience with the disobedient new leaders in Cuba and began to issue 
warning that Cuba’s continued disregard for American property would have consequences.72 
What followed was a political “tic-tac-toe game” between the two governments that would result 
in the U.S. government recruiting Cuban counter-revolutionaries to take violent action in Cuba 
against the revolution and fight a clandestine war between the two nations.73 As relations began 
to sour, Anastas Mikoyan, special envoy of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began to meet 
with members of the Revolutionary Government in an attempt to establish diplomatic relations 
and trade agreements.74 Initially, the Soviet government offered crude oil for prices lower than 
what the Cubans were used to paying the United States from where they imported all of their oil. 
In an attempt to break Washington’s monopoly on Cuba’s industry, Castro accepted the oil at 
reduced prices and in exchange for selling reduced price sugar to the Soviet Union, whose sugar 
consumption has historically rivaled that of the United States.75 This struck a soft spot with 
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Washington as not only were the Cubans now openly trading with their ideological enemy the 
Soviet Union, but they were losing their monopoly on Cuban oil consumption. The Eisenhower 
administration had one other political card left to play. All of the oil refineries in Cuba were 
owned by U.S. corporations.76
As Soviet crude oil began to arrive in Cuba, the managers at the U.S.-owned refineries 
refused to process the Russian oil. This was naturally met with anger on the part of the Cuban 
government as it demonstrated blatant disrespect towards a sovereign nation and what it could 
and could not do with industry on its own soil. The revolutionary government’s response was to 
nationalize the U.S. oil refineries in Cuba.77 This enraged Washington and Wall Street as they
lost their valuable refineries, and their Cold War adversary was now trading openly with their 
neighbor. Though this was Cuba’s right as a sovereign nation, this moment harkens back to an 
earlier time, that of the Platt Amendment, when regardless of what transpired, Washington 
demanded a say in Cuba’s political and economic conduct.78 In response to the nationalization of
the oil refineries in Cuba, the Eisenhower Administration cut off the Cuban sugar quota.79 The
quota was the lifeblood of the Cuban economy. Since 1898, the Unites States had purchased 
nearly ninety percent of Cuba’s annual sugar exports. Without that transaction, the Cuban 
government was placed in a difficult position as it was no longer making the revenue it needed to 
continue with its reforms and social programs, not to mention the day-to-day economic 
functioning of the island. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Luis A Pérez, The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 30-41. 
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documentary film, Fidel: The Untold Story, by Estela Bravo, 2003.  
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 The Soviet government gladly stepped in to fill the void left by the American government 
for its own geopolitical reasons. The Soviets agreed to purchase Cuba’s entire sugar product at 
above world market prices and agreed to low-interest development loans. This gave the Soviets a 
new ally a tiny distance from the United States. This is important to understanding Soviet 
motives in the region, but it should first be understood with a disclaimer. Too often the Cuban 
Revolution and its government have, from this moment forward, been regarded as pawns or a 
satellite of the Soviet Union.80 There was a fraternal relationship, and a series of agreements that 
certainly benefited the strategic interests of both parties; however, Fidel Castro continually 
asserted political independence from Moscow. Examples are numerous and these are not the 
focus of this project, but accurately assessing these events and Cuban-Soviet relations during this 
period allows historians to think differently about Cuba’s conduct in the region and its responses 
to counter-revolution both from within and without.81 Scholars must not make the mistake of 
seeing Cuba as a proxy at this point whether out of unwitting fallacy or a Eurocentric approach 
to the Cold War. 
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 Once Cuba’s sugar quota to the U.S. was cut off, the Revolutionary Government 
nationalized all U.S. business interests in Cuba, and with that, the clandestine war began. Cuban 
pilots on the payroll of the CIA bombed Cuban farmland and targets in Havana by late 1959, 
prompting immediate defensive responses from the Cuban government that would, in the long 
run, lead to victory in their Struggle Against Bandits. 
Militias and Nationalizations 
“Everyone knew a conflict was coming. You had to be blind not to see it. All we were 
looking to do was live in our own house as we saw fit and that is not something any people 
should have to demand from any other sovereign nation,” remembers Dr. Manuel Yepe. 
According to him, the revolutionaries wanted to have relations and commerce with any nation 
that would help their revolution progress, and the U.S. government considered that unacceptable. 
“Because we decided to chart our own path there began to be acts of sabotage by counter-
revolutionaries and then the horrendous explosion of La Coubre.”82 This brings us full circle to 
the explosion described at the beginning of this project and Fidel Castro’s declaration in its 
wake. It was a declaration of war. In his speech at the funeral of the bombing’s victims, he spoke 
directly to the forces of the counter-revolution:  
We make a promise to our fallen comrades, a promise forever. Cuba will never be intimidated, 
Cuba will never go back.83 The revolution will not be stopped; the revolution will not go back. 
The revolution will continue victoriously on its way, the revolution will continue on its march, 
yielding to nothing! We will never be strong enough to attack anyone, not only because we do 
not have enough men or arms or resources but because we have no right to attack anybody.84 Yet 
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we feel strong enough to defend ourselves, because we are defending what is right and we know 
how to defend that.85
The attack on La Coubre occurred amidst a number of other major events which, when 
analyzed, convey the drama of the beginning of the clandestine war between Havana and 
Washington. While the CIA was bombing Cuban cane fields to disrupt the harvest and 
destroying La Coubre, the revolution was reforming and restructuring the Rebel Army and 
organizing two other defensive bodies that would tip the balance in the battles to come, the 
National Revolutionary Militias (MNRs) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 
or (CDRs).86 The latter two organizations were meant to channel the desires of the general Cuban
population to defend themselves.. In October of 1959, the revolutionary government issued a 
statement in response to the initial bombings of cane fields, announcing the formation of the 
MNRs.87 The role of the militias was to recruit volunteers from the university and workers from
all industries, regardless of sex or vocation. The militias were meant to train the population to 
defend itself in case of attack and to make sure that the country was effectively defended by its 
increasingly politicized population in the form of a volunteer-based, radical working-class militia 
that was trained and equipped by the state while the Rebel Army was restructured and re-armed. 
Even as late as October of 1959, the Revolutionary Government lacked a source of 
armament outside what was left in Cuba by Batista’s army. The Rebel Army and the newly 
formed militias were still using the equipment captured from enemies in the Sierra Maestra, 
almost all of which was of U.S. origin. Since the Eisenhower Administration had cut off trade 
85 Fidel Castro, “Homeland or Death” reproduced in, Cuban Revolution Reader (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2008), p. 
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with Cuba, other arms providers had to be found.88 Once again the Soviets filled the void and 
agreed to provide Cuba with arms.89 It would take some time for the weapons to reach Cuba to 
bolster the island’s defenses, and so for a time the militias took center stage as Cuba’s most 
ready fighting force. By 1961 the Rebel Army would become the FAR, or Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Cuba, a more modernized conventional army that still retained its capabilities as a 
guerilla fighting force, but with a steady supply of arms and conventional military training. It 
would be these new militias and FAR units that would bring about the physical defeat of the 
armed counter-revolutionary bands during the clandestine struggle and that would turn back the 
invasion at the Bay of Pigs.90 Finally, the militias, combined with the reformation of the army, 
preempted any possibility of a reactionary coup as had occurred in Cuba on previous occasions. 
The leadership of the Cuban Revolution had learned the bitter lessons of Guatemala, Machado, 
and Batista. 
 August 6th of 1960 was the last straw in the eyes of the U.S. government and its allies. On 
that day, Cuba’s government finally nationalized all U.S. business holdings. The wealth of these 
companies in Cuba was to be returned to the Cuban people by putting that revenue toward the 
revolution’s expanding social programs. In a rousing speech at a Havana stadium, Fidel Castro 
signed Law 980 into action. Many revolutionary supporters saw this as the last tie to the 
oligarchy of the past being cut.91 After signing the document, Castro read aloud to the massive 
crowd, the list of companies to be nationalized. Each name was met with jeers and cries of “get 
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out!” from the crowd.92 “When Fidel called out the names of Standard Oil, Texaco, and United 
Fruit Company, the crowed thundered in applause. These were the companies that had been seen 
as exploitive toward us and we were happy to see them in our hands,” said Manuel Yepe in 
remembering the event.93 Later, a massive demonstration took place along the malecón in 
support of the nationalizations in which Cubans threw symbolic coffins, upon which were 
printed the names of the newly nationalized large corporations, into the sea.94 This reaffirmation 
of Cuban sovereignty was an act of a government that already saw itself under siege and at war; 
it was at this point that counter-revolutionary action against Cuba increased and intensified. 
CDRs and Fidel’s Visit to the U.N. 
 Fidel Castro traveled to the United States for a second time and addressed the United 
Nations General Assembly in September of 1960. It was here that he demanded that the United 
States stop its aggression towards Cuba and called on the nations of the world to condemn the 
insults to Cuba’s sovereignty that were being carried out on a frequent basis.95 He highlighted the 
fact that Cuba would defend itself and that its example would be followed all over the 
developing world. “This great mass of Humanity has said enough and began to move, the march 
of giants will not stop until the people attain true independence” were his words calling on the 
people of the Third World to take up the call of the Cubans to join them in struggle against 
reactionary forces.96 
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 This was not a subtle message. Castro was proclaiming that Cuba intended to resist, and 
that the Cuban government was not willing to go back on its promises. Castro knew that the 
reaction from Washington and Miami would be swift. Immediately after his return from New 
York he founded the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).97 The CDRs were 
neighborhood watch organizations led by volunteers, committed cadres of the revolution, who 
would help train citizens in defense preparations, and who would hold regular meetings to 
discuss revolutionary developments. They became the largest mass organization in Cuba charged 
with monitoring counter-revolutionary activity and mobilizing the public against incursions into 
Cuba. In essence, the CDRs became a public intelligence-gathering organization that helped 
mobilize the citizenry in times of conflict, while remaining vigilant in times of peace.98 Other 
roles fulfilled by the CDRs included volunteer labor, community cleanup, and mutual assistance. 
CDRs became places of learning and ideological commitment. Critics of the revolution see the 
CDRs as a massive spy network designed to pit citizens against one another in an effort to sniff 
out ideological imperfections. Though there was an element of surveillance to the CDRs they 
have historically been far from the Stalinist bodies they are typically portrayed as outside of 
Cuba. The CDRs have historically served not just in defense but also in campaigns against 
disease, and they aided educational reform, ran breakfast programs for children, and helped form 
the FMC, or Federation of Cuban Women.99  The CDRs eventually helped the revolutionary 
government not only defeat armed counter-revolutionary  bands, but also served as a unifying 
                                                          
97 There is a little-known but extremely important work by Richard Fagen that looks specifically at the emergence 
and organization of mass organizations and their role in consolidating the Cuban Revolution and popular 
participation in these organizations. The CDRs receive the most attention, particularly in how they brought Cubans 
together and placed them at the center of conducting the revolution. Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of 
Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).  
98 Richard R. Fagen The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 
83-96. 
99 Ibid. 62-68. 
42 
body in the face of the adverse conditions of the clandestine struggle and the hardships of the 
U.S. embargo. 
By mid-1960 the board was set and the pieces were in motion. Within the first year and a 
half of Cuba’s revolutionary process, there had been earthshaking reforms to Cuban society. The 
land had been redistributed and the foreign companies had been removed. The state was being 
restructured by feisty young leaders who were determined to assert Cuba’s sovereign right to 
conduct itself as it saw fit.100 The mass organizations meant to shore up Cuba’s defense were
being organized and trained. Revolutionary supporters joined mass organizations or the armed 
forces to take part in the revolutionary process. Thousands sought to heed the warnings of their 
leaders, that without creating the apparatuses to defend the revolution from both internal and 
external threats, the revolution would be destroyed by reactionary elements as they had been in 
many other parts of the Americas. 
The Literacy Campaign 
Hundreds of thousands of Cubans in 1961 answered the call when that year was declared 
the year of literacy. Running concurrently with the “Struggle against Bandits” Cuba’s leadership 
organized a massive, nation-wide literacy campaign that remains of the most admired triumphs 
and shining moments of the Cuban Revolution. Before the revolution experts place Cuba’s 
illiteracy rate at 23.6 percent.101 Over the course of 1961, young people were mobilized and
trained to teach. They were sent in brigades to the countryside to work with the farmers by day 
100 Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre composed a book of his firsthand accounts in Cuba when he traveled there in 1960 
to watch the new revolution unfold. In this masterwork, Sartre asserts that one of the most important victories of the 
revolution was not only its destruction of the latifundia system, but how the revolution turned national power over to 
very young people. Sartre’s book contains an entire chapter entitled, “The Kids Take Over.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Sartre 
on Cuba (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961), p. 88-97. 
101 Mark Abendroth, Rebel Literacy: Cuba’s National Literacy Campaign and Critical Global Citizenship (Duluth: 
Litwin Books, 2009), p. 1-4. 
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and teach them by lamplight at night. Teenage women and men traveled into every community, 
and, by November of 1961, Cuba was declared free of illiteracy. This was an unprecedented 
success whose model has been utilized by Cuban volunteer teachers ever since all over the 
world.102 The campaign served as one more massive popular mobilization which helped to foster 
a sense of community in many Cubans as well as give them a stake in their revolution.103 
Eventually as the clandestine war intensified, many of these young teachers would come under 
fire and became casualties (a number as will be seen were murdered by counter-revolutionary 
bands).104 The campaign was not suspended, and, rather than frighten people away, the attacks 
increased popularity of the literacy campaign. What is often overlooked in the few analyses 
available of the 1961 literacy campaign is that even in a time of national emergency, the popular 
reforms continued. 
 For their part, Washington and Miami were quick to prove correct the revolutionaries’ 
assertion that they sought to destroy the Cuban revolutionary process. As tensions increased, the 
CIA under the Eisenhower Administration increased its subversive activities in Cuba. The CIA 
began recruiting assets and drawing up plans to clandestinely funnel them into Cuba to wreak 
havoc on the recently nationalized economy and eventually to take up arms against the new state. 
Within the first year of the clandestine struggle, as will be seen in the following chapter, 
numerous umbrella organizations were recruited, armed, funded, and trained in the U.S. and 
Central America to pave the way for counter-revolutionary activity on the island. The U.S. 
government saw itself as slighted by the young rebels, Wall Street saw their bottom lines suffer, 
and the Cuban upper classes that were leaving the island were maddened by then the loss of their 
                                                          
102 Ibid., p. 71-91. 
103 Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 
p. 33-68. 
104 Mark Abendroth, Rebel Literacy: Cuba’s National Literacy Campaign and Critical Global Citizenship (Duluth: 
Litwin Books, 2009), p. 2-3, 72. 
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bower base and privileges. This mixture of anger, hubris, and economic ambition would set in 
motion the subversive actions of the counter-revolution that would continue until the final defeat 
of the armed groups in the Escombray Mountains in 1963. In the following chapter, we will 
analyze the clandestine machinations of the CIA and their counter-revolutionary Cuban allies. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Victory at Playa Gíron and the Birth of the Mambí Commandos 
 
“We are standing in the water!” 
Blue Beach: Playa Girón, April 19th 1961 
 “The beachhead perimeter is being breached! Massed artillery is inbound and enemy air 
force is continuing to strafe brigade positions. Tanks are closing in on Blue Beach. Militia and 
brigade forces are fighting on the beach. We are about to be overrun! Where is the air-support 
damn it?! We are standing in the water. Help must arrive within the hour!” This was a series of 
radio transmissions and coded wire cables sent by José “Pepe” San Román, the field commander 
of Brigade 2506, to Grayston L. Lynch, the coordinating officer of the Central Intelligence 
agency on board the merchant ship Blagar in the last moments of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs. 
After being told that orders were being awaited from Washington, Román reported that his 
position was under attack and that he was destroying his radio equipment, and the survivors were 
going to flee into the swamp.105 Before Lynch could reply, the line went dead, effectively cutting 
off communications between the most expensive and long-planned U.S. operation against Cuba 
of that time, and the American intelligence apparatus that had funded, trained, and deployed it. 
                                                          
105 Grayston L. Lynch, Decision for Disaster: The Battle of the Bay of Pigs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 
p.213-216. 
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 For almost three days straight, the 2506 Brigade fought to maintain its tenuous beachhead 
in southern Cuba. After nearly two years of preparation, the solders of the strike force felt 
confident that their effort to invade Cuba and spark a national uprising could be nothing but a 
success. The brigade was made up of members of the Cuban business class and the sons of 
wealthy Cuban landowners, former members of Batista’s military, and disaffected former 
members of the revolutionary movement who rejected the radicalization of the Cuban political 
process. The nearly 1,400 soldiers had been recruited by the CIA and trained in secret bases in 
Florida, Louisiana, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. CIA operatives and local Cuban assets 
staged acts of sabotage, subversion, and terrorism to sow confusion and chaos to prepare for the 
landing. The most important boost of confidence for the brigade was simply that they were being 
organized, trained, and supported by the most powerful nation in the world which had promised 
them all the military and logistical support they needed for their success. What the brigade and 
their CIA station chiefs did not count on was the passionate and tenacious resistance of the 
Cuban public that would literally drive them into the sea. In all of their confident theorizing, they 
seemed to have forgotten the Cuban people.   
 Books about the Invasion of Playa Gíron number well into the hundreds. It is not the 
purpose of this study to delve deeply into the battle itself or into a day by day account. This has 
been well covered elsewhere.106 It is the purpose of this study to frame this monumental event in 
the context of the Struggle Against Bandits. In other words, what role did the clandestine groups 
                                                          
106 The project has made extensive use of some of the most in-depth, military histories of the Bay of Pigs in order to 
situate the clandestine struggle in proper context. For a closer look at the day-by-day events of the battle see: Juan 
Carlos Rodríguez The Inevitable Battle: From the Bay of Pigs to Playa Gíron (Havana: Editorial Capítan San Luís, 
2009); Fidel Castro and José Ramon Fernández Playa Gíron: Bay of Pigs, Washington’s First Military Defeat in the 
Americas (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2001); Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of 
Cuba, edited by Peter Kornbluh, (New York: the New Press, 1998); Grayston L. Lynch, Descision for Disaster: The 
Battle of the Bay of Pigs (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), Fidel Castro and 2506 Brigade defendants, History of an 
Aggression (Havana: Ediciones Venceremos, 1964). 
47 
infiltrated into Cuba before the invasion play in the invasion itself, and how did the outcome 
further the evolution of these groups and the Cuban Government’s response to them? As a result 
of the CIA’s failure at Playa Gíron, the strategy of the counter-revolution shifted from one of 
sabotage and harassment, to outright invasion, and then into a period of autonomous operations. 
The defeat of the mercenary battalion on the sands of Playa Gíron is too often, within the 
scholarship in the United States and popular political discourse in the U.S., viewed as simply a 
resounding failure, a fiasco and a disaster. While this is an accurate characterization, it is rarely 
viewed through a Cuban lens. For the Cubans, Gíron was the first defeat of a U.S.-backed act of 
intervention in the Americas. What is more, within U.S. academic circles and U.S. popular 
culture, it is common to analyze the failure of the invasion and the preliminary actions of the 
counter-revolutionary fifth column through an entire body of circumstances ranging from the 
weather to presidential order. Examples of this appear in the constant debate surrounding 
President John Kennedy’s withdrawal of air support over the beaches, and his unwillingness to 
commit U.S. combat troops to the invasion. Other examples appear in debates about the role of 
the weather the day of the landing, and accidents such as when the invasion force was spotted by 
charcoal makers walking the beach. All of these factors naturally played a role in the failure of 
the operation, but academics in the U.S. and outside of Cuba commonly elide the most important 
factor, the Cubans themselves.107
107 The majority of current scholarship pertaining to this period of Cuba’s history is inundated with books about the 
Mafia’s role in Cuba which is extremely important, but seems to be overtaking the body of work released in the last 
few years. One example is William Weyland Turner’s book The Cuban Connection: Nixon, Castro, and the Mob. A 
more exhaustive and authoritative work is by Jack Colhoun, called Gangsterismo: The United States, Cuba and the 
Mafia: 1933 to 1966. The rest, as stated before, is filled with the “disaster” narrative pertaining to the Bay of Pigs. 
Just in recent  years some of the major recent books released even convey this in their titles, books like Jim 
Radenberger’s The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, or even 
Grayston Lynch’s memoir, Decision for Disaster: The Battle for the Bay of Pigs. 
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 Upon hearing of the invasion, hundreds of thousands of Cubans from all over the island 
turned out into the streets, demanding weapons from the government.108 The Cuban Revolution’s 
base of support was stronger in that moment than it has ever been, and the invasion force was not 
met as a group of liberators as the brigade had been convinced it would be. Rather, they were 
met as mercenary invaders at the service of a foreign government who sought to roll back the 
reforms that had benefitted so many Cuban citizens.109 When viewed through this lens and from 
the perspective of the supporters of the Cuban Revolution, a view so rarely seen within the U.S. 
academy, the invasion of Playa Gíron serves as an example of the overall defeat of the counter-
revolution due to lack of popular support. The Bay of Pigs serves as a vivid demonstration that 
the efforts to subvert, sabotage, terrorize, and derail the Cuban Revolution, though damaging, 
costly, and traumatic, were mostly failures. They were failures because the counter-revolution 
lacked sympathy and support from the broader Cuban population. 
 The 2506 Brigade that landed at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 remains the most well-known 
counter-revolutionary unit, but they were not the only organization in operation at the time, and 
many of its survivors would play roles in the clandestine struggle well beyond the 1961 invasion. 
The 2506 leadership had close ties to the media and were openly courted by the Kennedy White 
House, but what developed in the period between the breakdown of relations between Cuba and 
the United States in 1959 and the invasion was the creation of a complex web of counter-
revolutionary organizations backed by the CIA. Each of these organizations used and were used 
by American policy makers for their own political ends. Though all operated with CIA guidance 
and Washington’s participation, they were not a monolithic group. The sheer complexity of the 
                                                          
108 Fidel Castro, “We Relied on a Revolutionary People,” Playa Girón: Bay of Pigs, Washington’s First Military 
Defeat in the Americas (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2001), p. 186-192. 
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counter-revolutionary web spun by the CIA and influential émigré leaders is overlooked by 
many historians. In overlooking this, the real extent of the clandestine struggle becomes lost as 
does its transformative effect on U.S. policy. 
From Miami to Clandestinity 
The previous chapter discussed the radical reforms and restructuring of the Cuban 
political and economic landscape. The domestic counter-revolution, made up of members of the 
upper and middle classes, former Batista military men and political supporters, and 
representatives of the American mafia, would eventually form diverse pockets of opposition to 
the revolution and would enjoy preferential treatment and logistical support from Washington. In 
reality, all organized groups that took up arms to roll back the Cuban Revolution were recruited 
and organized by the Central Intelligence Agency.110 The émigré community provided the
recruits and the operatives, but the U.S. Government supplied the organizational structure, 
funding, and equipment. Over the years, differences between these organizations would develop 
as would continual shifts in strategic thinking on the part of American policy makers. These 
strategic shifts were direct results of the continual frustration and defeat of most of the operations 
undertaken. 
Miami became and remains the epicenter of anti-Castro sentiment in the United States, 
outside the seat of government in Washington D.C. and perhaps in many ways even more so. In 
the months following Fulgencio Batsita’s flight from Cuba, his upper and middle-class 
supporters began to leave for the United States. Eventually, as the revolutionary process 
radicalized and expanded its reforms, more and more of the business class began to leave for 
110 Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban Counter-Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), p.87-74. 
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Miami assuming that there would be yet another change in government in short order. There was 
a common sentiment in the émigré community that Washington would not let the actions of the 
new Cuban government stand. The Cuban government was nationalizing U.S. industries and 
landholdings and asserting strict national sovereignty. The United States government had 
invaded and occupied Latin American nations over the course of a century for much less.111 
Cuba, the émigrés thought, would be no different.112 Though Fidel Castro traveled to the United 
States almost immediately after coming to power in an effort to establish, at the very least, civil 
relations with the U.S., with a foreign policy based on respect among equals, the Eisenhower 
Administration looked for ways to pressure the young leader to moderate his stances on a 
number of issues. As a backup plan, the Eisenhower Administration began preparing operatives 
to take action against the new state.113  
 Miami became a city filled with those who stood to lose, not only with the ouster of 
Batista but also with the growing nationalizations of industry. Miami was not unlike many parts 
of Southern France following the Independence of Algeria which was taking place at the same 
time. It was a place filled with the angry overthrown. It was a place filled with wealthy people 
who resented Castro and his revolutionary movement. One of these men was Rafael Martínez 
Pupo. Martínez Pupo, who will figure prominently as this study progresses, was a wealthy 
industrialist who had owned multiple large businesses and tracts of land before the reforms and 
                                                          
111 The CIA-orchestrated coup against Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 was carried out due to the moderate 
nationalizations of United Fruit lands that were taking place. The anti-communist rhetoric of the day was strongly 
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University Press, 1992). 
112 An interesting series of interviews of prominent conservative Miami émigrés appears in Saul Landau’s film on 
the Cuban counter-revolution, Would the Real Terrorist Please Stand Up? (Cinema Libre, 2011). 
113 William Weyland Turner, The Cuban Connection: Nixon, Castro, and the Mob (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 
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who would eventually become the spokesperson for one of the most well-funded and organized 
counter-revolutionary groups that infiltrated Cuba under CIA direction, the Comandos 
Mambíses. The case of Rafael Martínez Pupo serves as a common (though in this case little 
known) example in the development of the Cuban counter-revolution. Martínez’s example 
provides a compelling window into the inner workings of the counter-revolutionary 
organizations that claimed independence but were part of the CIA network. The anti-Castro 
groups occupied a tenuous position between asserting their own political independence and 
credibility while falling under the auspices of the CIA. The anti-Castro operatives were by no 
means monolithic and had their own aims and goals, but all were in some way beholden to the 
CIA. This would plague them well beyond the period discussed in this study. 
Martínez Pupo rose to become one of the most prominent links between the CIA and the 
Miami organizations, but he began in the same as many other upper-class counter-
revolutionaries. Martínez had been an industrialist and landowner with a pedigree. His grandson, 
Alejandro de la Cruz, recorded his grandfather’s story in a privately published biography filled 
with grandiose notions of historical reincarnation.114 Martínez is described as a man with family
ties dating all the way back to the Spanish conquistadores. The Martínez family had supposedly 
been involved in the struggle against Spain in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Following 
the U.S. intervention in 1898, they made millions in the sugar industry and through multiple 
businesses including property rental, shops, and restaurants. Martínez made large profits during 
the Batista years, but according to the narrative of his grandson and those who knew him, he also 
understood that it would be beneficial to play both sides of the Cuban revolutionary struggle. 
Though his businesses were flourishing in the late 1950s under Batista, Martínez understood that 
114 Alejandro de la Cruz, Child of this Time (Miami: Independent Publication), p. 1-15. 
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if Batista lost the war, there would be a new government he would have to deal with, and, 
regardless of who was in power, he desired preferential treatment. The answer to the dilemma 
was to hedge his bets. Martínez sent small trucks of supplies such as medicines and food up to 
the rebels in the mountains in an effort to foster a friendly relationship with the revolutionary 
movement even as he continued to fill Batista’s coffers. From the perspective of those like 
Rafael Martínez and other industrialists who either grew tired of Batista’s brutality or were 
attempting to play both sides, there was very little that was new about Castro’s movement. There 
had been armed struggles and revolutions before in Cuba, and all of them, for nearly a century, 
had ended in the same ways. Either the movement was crushed by the government with U.S. 
backing, or the new governments brought into power were bought off or took part in the same 
graft as the regimes before them.115 What was going to be so different about Castro?
By the mid-1960s, Martínez and many others like him were feeling betrayed and that 
their “investment” of support was being overlooked as the Revolutionary Government 
nationalized industry and large landholdings.116 While hundreds of thousands received land of
their own, homes of their own, or had their rents slashed, the battle lines were being drawn as the 
nationalizations continued and the former owners continued to leave for Miami. The 
revolutionary government understood, however, that there were members of the business classes 
who had been against Batista and also had the technical and administrative knowledge to 
115 The United States had invaded Haiti, Nicaragua, and Cuba multiple times during the 1898 conflict and the early 
twentieth century. In 1954, the Arbenz government in Guatemala was violently overthrown in retaliation for 
moderate land reforms. The case of Cuba was interesting as there had been earlier uprisings against the corrupt and 
repressive governments selected by Washington. The most prominent of these was in 1933 during the presidency of 
Gerardo Machado. After massive popular protests and the intervention of the army, Machado fled the country and a 
provisional government was established, however, the reforms by that provisional government were few. The 
military eventually stepped into power with a young Fulgencio Batista at its head. The military junta promised to 
end the chaotic violence in the capital, which they did, but they also co-opted and counteracted the more progressive 
elements within the provisional government, subverting a possible transformative period in Cuban history. Luis E. 
Aguilar’s book Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution is a wonderful in-depth analysis of this period in Cuba’s history. 
116Alejandro de la Cruz, Child of this Time (Miami: Independent Publication), p. 15-22. 
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continue to run the economy once it was restructured. The government made propositions to a 
number of those who had aided the rebels. Many were offered high-level government and 
administrative positions in an effort to give them a place within the revolution.  Castro offered 
Martínez an ambassadorship.117 The new government needed personnel with business experience
and good international standing to help rebuild and restructure the country and its economic 
system, but many would have no part in it. Martínez, a millionaire and militant Catholic, refused 
to participate in what he saw as the encroachment of “godless communism” in Cuba.118 While
his family and so many other, more conservative, Cubans chose to emigrate, Martinez instead 
traveled to Central America, where he owned a great deal of property, and placed himself at the 
disposal of the Central Intelligence Agency.119 His story is a common one within the
conservative émigré community. What is unique about Martínez is how his presence continually 
re-emerges in numerous aspects of the clandestine struggle. Through intermediary contacts, 
beginning in 1960, Martínez began to take an active role in the attempts to remove Castro from 
power. This coincided with the beginning of what came to be called the “Controlled Period of 
Operations.” 120
While the CIA infiltrated small isolated groups into Cuba and used Mafia connections to 
make scattered attacks on Cuban targets under orders from the Eisenhower Administration, they 
sought locations to train a secret strike force made up of Cuban émigrés that would invade Cuba 
117 Ibid,. 20-40. 
118 Like many in the U.S. Government, Martínez and those in his position were effectively deciding that Cuba’s 
revolution was a Communist one well before it was declared as such. The 26th of July Movement had always self-
identified as radical and left leaning but was a coalition of different political persuasions. The Revolution was not 
officially articulated as a socialist one until 1961, and the Cuban Communist Party would not be reformed until 
1965. 
119  Alejandro de la Cruz, Child of this Time (Miami: Independent Publication), p. 40-55. 
120 The period of “Controlled Operations” began with the first airstrikes from Batistano pilots in mid-1959 through 
the Invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Encompassing, assassinations of literacy volunteers, attacks on militia and army 
targets, firebombing of shops and another terrorist attacks that will be analyzed further in the coming chapters. 
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on the back of a wave of sabotage.121 Part of that problem was solved by Martínez Pupo, who 
owned large tracts of land in Guatemala. He voluntarily turned this farmland deep in the 
Guatemalan countryside over to the CIA, and the training of what would become the 2506 
Brigade began.122 
Counter-Revolutionary Activity 1959-1961: The Controlled Period 
After Castro’s overtures were rejected in Washington and as the revolution went ahead 
with its reforms, the Eisenhower Administration tasked the CIA with laying the groundwork to 
remove Castro from power and organize a counter-revolutionary front that would return to power 
those more apt to bow to Washington’s interests. The organizations were to be tightly controlled 
and would implement a two-pronged attack on the Cuban Revolution. They were to sabotage and 
attack economic targets, causing as much damage as possible to the Cuban economy, and they 
were to train operatives that would be infiltrated into Cuba to help spark an island-wide 
opposition movement. Initially the CIA worked closely with former members of Batista’s 
military and their Mafia contacts.123 They had what were thought to be the connections and 
experience to maintain a counter-revolutionary movement.124 With unmarked planes launched 
from the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, the Batistanos napalmed sugar 
cane fields and strafed parts of Havana on several occasions.125 
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From early on these efforts were met with resistance from within Cuba. The Cuban 
Revolutionary Intelligence services had very effective networks of loyal agents in place in 
Miami and across Central America, and they received a great deal of cooperation from private 
citizens in Cuba, particularly at the neighborhood level and at the workplace.126 As the popular 
reforms expanded and the United States cut off the sugar quota and placed additional sanctions 
on Cuba, and the acts of aggression expanded to pirate attacks on Cuban ships and port 
installations.127 These counter-revolutionary groups were able to cause a considerable amount of 
damage to farmlands and factories, but the counter-revolution’s efforts to create enough chaos 
and fear that people turned away from the popular reforms was unsuccessful. The expanded 
introduction of Cuban agents into the Miami community and the vigilance of neighborhood 
watch committees led to the foiling of an even greater number of counter-revolutionary plots. 
Counter-revolutionaries were frequently apprehended not long after entering the country, and 
many attempts at sabotage and destabilization failed because as security improved, the plans 
were often foiled before being put into action.128 A reason for this lack of success is that the 
general public rejected these groups because they were made up of former Batistanos. Even the 
CIA recognized that there had to be a shift in recruitment simply because many people in Cuba 
did not want to provide aid and comfort to their former oppressors. Eventually the Batistano 
organizations were defunded and faded into obscurity while many of their most militant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
126 There is an exhibit detailing the participation of private citizens in the CDR in this period. The Museum of 
September 23rd as it is called (for the day of the foundation of the CDRs), is an interesting museum that few 
outsiders have the opportunity to see. It is located on Calle Obispo in the old part of Havana. It is walking distance 
from the Pan-American docks where La Coubre was bombed. The author visited this exhibit twice, once in 2011, 
and again in 2012. 
127 Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations 1959-1962 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004), p. 41-59. 
128 In an interview with American filmmaker Saul Landau, Fabian Escalante of Cuban intelligence explained that the 
deployment of Cuban agents into Miami was done out of necessity. Because the harassment against Cuba intensified 
quickly, it became increasingly necessary to send Cuban volunteers to infiltrate the Miami émigré community. This 
interview was conducted for Landau’s film Would the Real Terrorist Please Stand Up? which was released by 
Cinema Libre in 2011. 
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operatives folded into later organizations. The CIA was placed in a position in which it would 
have to distance itself from many prominent Batistanos, though they remained ardent counter-
revolutionaries. They had lost their standing within Cuba. Instead, the CIA would turn to well-
placed men who were not prominent former members of the Batista government, but who were 
willing to take action against the revolution, men like Rafael Martínez.  
While Rafael Martínez Pupo’s land was being used as a training ground for the CIA’s 
infiltration teams, the agency already had operations in the planning stages that were meant, in 
theory, to bring about the defeat of the revolution through an underground insurrection led by 
infiltrated CIA operatives working with local underground counter-revolutionaries.129 Between 
early to mid-1960, the idea was to continue the destabilization activities with the operatives 
already on the ground in Cuba while preparing a special detachment of Cuban émigrés in 
Guatemala and Nicaragua to be parachuted into Cuba to carry out hit and run attacks that would 
inspire those against the revolution within Cuba to take up arms.130 This plan was formulated on 
the assumption that within Cuba there were large numbers of citizens with anti-revolutionary 
sentiments. In 1960, the largest act of counter-revolutionary terror up to that point came in the 
form of the previously mentioned, CIA bombing of La Coubre. Counter-revolutionary terrorist 
activity was reaching new levels. It was expanding from phantom air raids and scattered acts of 
sabotage to the bombings of civilian workplaces.  
The Revolutionary Government was not naïve, it understood that these were well-funded, 
well-organized attacks. Military personnel were not the only victims of the counter-revolution. 
The majority of Cuban citizens killed by counter-revolutionary operatives in this period were 
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civilians.131 Between late 1960 and early 1961 there was a wave of department store fire
bombings that were a part of the destabilization campaign meant to pave the way for the planned 
internal uprising by the anti-Castro forces on the island. The most famous of these took place just 
days before the Bay of Pigs invasion, the bombing at the El Encanto, the largest and most well-
known department store in Havana. After closing time, a single CIA operative, after being paid, 
placed flammable material in one of the clothing departments and set the store ablaze. The 
counter-revolutionaries were attempting to send a message to the revolution’s supporters that 
nationalized property was to be targeted. The building was quickly engulfed in flames. A lone 
worker, Fe de Valle, a member the CTC, the central trade union, had just left work at the store 
and locked the doors. She rushed back into the store in an attempt to save a cashbox that had 
been filled with funds for the agrarian reform and that was a donation in solidarity from the 
union at the store to the union of small farmers. She was killed in her attempt.132 Thousands
marched in the funeral procession for Fe de Valle. This was one more symbolic moment where 
rather than capitulating to the confusion and discontent that the CIA and their operatives sought 
to sow, more and more Cubans instead joined the mass organizations, especially the militias and 
CDRs.133
While the training and introduction of operatives continued, the counter-revolutionaries 
undertook two more activities that were meant to inspire an island-wide anti-Castro uprising. By 
the spring of 1961, Cuba’s massive volunteer literacy campaign was underway. CIA assets and 
131 Keith Bolender, “The Unknown War” in Voices From the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism Against 
Cuba (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 1-21. 
132 Interview with Luis José Campa Sánchez, former clerk at El Encanto in Ibid, p.193-197. 
133 Keith Bolender’s book, Voices from the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism Against Cuba, is a powerful 
collection of oral histories and interviews of survivors and relatives of victims of terrorism in Cuba. This book is 
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local operatives attempted to dissuade Cuban citizens from participating in the campaign by 
targeting literacy workers.134 Though by the end of 1961 the campaign was over and the island
celebrated its successful eradication of illiteracy, fourteen young literacy workers, mostly 
teenagers, had been killed, all of them victims of counter-revolutionary activity. The first teacher 
killed was a young student by the name of Conrado Benítez. A counter-revolutionary band 
captured Benítez in the countryside while he was teaching an older farmer to read.135 Both the
elderly farmer and Benítez were tortured and hung as examples.136 Instead of being frightened,
hundreds of thousands of young people volunteered for the newly christened “Conrado Benítez 
Brigades” named for the martyred teacher.137 Dr. Marta Nuñez Sarmiento was a fourteen year
old brigadista in 1961, and she remembers her reasons for joining the campaign very clearly. 
“I was fourteen, we were all quite young but many of us had not been old enough to take 
any active part in the anti-Batista struggle.” They wanted to do their part, said Nuñez, “I have 
been to the United States, and I know that your Second World War generation to this day feels 
very proud of their service, we were no different in this case.” For that generation, this was not 
political rhetoric. “It was like cleaning up after a devastating storm and helping your neighbors. 
In this case the storm was illiteracy. The deaths of the volunteer teachers saddened us but it also 
gave us a sense that though we were not carrying guns into battle, we were fighting against an 
enemy.”138
134 This is a tactic that would be reused by the CIA and counter-revolutionary forces in Nicaragua during the Contra 
War. 
135 The literacy campaign brought young instructors from the city to live with rural families and work with them by 
day and teach them at night. 
136 Keith Bolender, Voices From the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism Against Cuba (London: Pluto Press, 
2010), p. 161-166. 
137 Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 
p. 42-68.
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If anything, what was accomplished by the counter-revolution, other than the murder of 
Cuban citizens and the destruction of many workplaces, was to warn the Cuban intelligence 
community that something bigger was brewing. Every major U.S. intervention before 1961, from 
Iran to Guatemala, had been preceded by campaigns of disinformation and sabotage. Supporters 
of the revolution understood that there would be more concentrated action on the part of the CIA, 
but where and when? What the Cubans did not know was that a shift in the U.S. government and 
Miami-based counter-revolutionaries’ strategy was underway. 
Operation Pluto: The Shift from Sabotage to Invasion 
As the Kennedy Administration ascended to the White House, they would order yet 
further intensification of the activity against Cuba. Kennedy had labeled his opponent, Richard 
Nixon, in the 1960 election as being “soft on Cuba.” The U.S. Embassy in Cuba was closed after 
the Revolutionary Government forced it out upon discovering that some of the staff were 
actually U.S. intelligence agents. It was at this point that Kennedy was informed of the expansive 
plans to to remove Fidel Castro from power.139 Washington grew tired of the lack of results 
coming from the infiltrated agents already in place. There was no uprising in support of the 
counter-revolutionaries, and it seemed that without a reevaluation of tactics, Castro would 
remain in power. JMWAVE, the Miami CIA operations center, was ordered to change plans by 
the leadership of the agency. Faster results were demanded and so the strategy changed. The CIA 
brought in new staff with more of an eye for conventional military action. A core group of 
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veterans of the Offices of Strategic Services in the Second World War were tasked with 
changing the operational plans for the Cuba Project. The new plan was called Operation Pluto.140
 What began as a series of scattered hit and run sabotage actions meant to spark a 
counter-revolutionary general strike, was changed by CIA headquarters at Langley to an all-out 
conventional assault, orchestrated in a way to maximize plausible deniability of U.S. 
involvement. In other words, a strike force would be deployed into Cuba but it would be made to 
seem that the émigrés were acting on their own. The training centers were retooled, and orders 
were changed. The counter-revolutionaries recruited amongst the émigrés and brought to Central 
America began to retrain for amphibious landings rather than secret parachute drops and pirate 
raids. The scattered cells that were originally going to be introduced into Cuba in a scattered 
fashion were combined into a strike force of brigade strength, the 2506 Brigade.141 Operation
Pluto was based on the island-hopping campaign of the Second World War in the South 
Pacific.142 The plan consisted of the clandestine groups that were already in place staging a wave
of sabotage while the counter-revolutionary radio stations would broadcast disinformation to 
confuse the Cuban government. Kennedy added an addendum to the CIA plan: no U.S. military 
personnel were to be utilized publicly for the sake of plausible deniability. Kennedy thought that 
one of the reasons more people had not joined the counter-revolution was because the groups 
were obviously not independent of U.S. or Batistano control. His idea was to give the appearance 
that a militant group of independent anti-Castro fighters was taking matters into its own hands. A 
provisional government in exile was created and immediately flown into the landing zone in 
140 Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965 (Washington: Potomac 
Books, 2005), p.31-50. 
141 The brigade took its name from the dog tag number of a recruit killed during training. Grayston L. Lynch 
Decision for Disaster: The Battle of the Bay of Pigs (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), p.38-39. 
142 Grayston L. Lynch Decision for Disaster: The Battle of the Bay of Pigs (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), p. 56-
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order to be recognized by Washington upon the establishment of a stable beachhead in Cuba. 
This would give a legitimate reason for the U.S. government to commit troops to aid the 
“freedom fighters.”143 
The zone of action was moved from the mountains of central Cuba to the Zapata swamp 
in southern Cuba at a place called the Bay of Pigs. A day before the landing, a 2506 Brigade air 
force flew bombing missions over Cuban airfields in an attempt to neutralize the small Cuban air 
force on the ground.144 The planes bore Cuban insignia in an effort to make it seem that there 
was a mutiny in the revolutionary air force.145 The landing was to begin within forty-eight hours, 
in theory with the Revolutionary Air Force destroyed. This did not occur and was a major factor 
in the defeat of the brigade. After a series of bombings in Havana in addition to the airstrikes, the 
invasion began early on April 17th. A unit of brigade paratroopers landed in the Zapata swamp to 
secure a foothold for the main body that landed before dawn. The moment a beachhead was 
secured, the pre-organized “government in exile” was to be flown in, but none of this occured. 
The airfields had been bombed, but the Revolutionary Air Force remained almost totally 
intact.146 Though the landings took place in force as planned, instead of being welcomed on the 
beach as returning heroes as they had been promised by their leaders, an angry populace in arms 
turned out to throw the invasion back.147 Within hours, the CDRs had mobilized and aided state 
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security in locating citizens under suspicion of being counterrevolutionaries. This sweep cut off 
the invasion force from their prospective pockets of support.148 
Fidel Castro personally took command of the revolutionary forces at the front, and, after 
only forty eight-hours of intense combat, the invasion was turned back.149 The importance of the 
seventy-two hours between the initial bombing of the Cuban airfields and the surrender of 
Brigade 2506, though well-documented and analyzed, cannot be overstated, especially from the 
perspective of the supporters of the Cuban Revolution and its leadership. It was just after the 
bombings and on the eve of the landing, at the funeral for those killed in the airstrikes, that Fidel 
Castro made one of the most important declarations in Cuban history:“ What the imperialists 
cannot stand is that we are here, we exist, and we have made a socialist revolution right under 
their noses and that we are willing to defend that revolution.”150 
With this statement, Castro officially proclaimed the socialist character of the revolution. 
This was a pivotal moment for the Cuban Revolution. It was a way of saying not only to the 
enemies of the movement but also its supporters that there would be no turning back the clock. 
The reforms would continue, and aggression would be resisted. Playa Gíron remains one of the 
most celebrated events in Cuban history and popular memory. One militiaman remembers 
feelings that many of his comrades in arms had just as they were moving off to the front. “This 
was the moment we had all been preparing for. We had trained for months.” His unit was made 
up of young students and workers from the city. Few of them had been involved with the armed 
struggle against Batista, but this was seen as their chance to do their part. “We knew the likes of 
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those who were coming to fight us. We had dealt with them for years, and people were ready and 
they were angry.”151
The 2506 Brigade was initially able to entrench themselves in the Zapata swamp and near 
the town of Playa Gíron, but once they came under attack from the Cuban Air Force, which they 
had believed to have been destroyed, the situation changed. Meanwhile, the militias were sent 
down the central highway to confront the invasion.152 It was here that the militia came under
attack from the 2506 Brigade aircraft that continued to fly bombing missions over the beachhead. 
Columns of militia came under napalm attack on the central highway and casualties were high. 
The first line of defense was in need of reinforcement. By the beginning of the third day of 
fighting the 2506 Brigade’s ships were damaged and forced out to sea, and most of their planes 
had been shot out of the sky. The Cubans were eventually able to amass artillery fire on the 
beachhead, and a column of tanks broke through the invaders’ line of defense. In the face of 
larger numbers of combatants, as well as air and artillery support, the 2506 Brigade was driven to 
the water’s edge. Most of the invading brigade surrendered quickly.153 Again a militia man
remembers, “Before too long as the prisoners were being gathered, the comandante arrived. The 
prisoners were quite worried that they would all be shot, but instead the comandante ordered that 
they be given water, food, and medical treatment. I was only a teenager, but being a part of that 
battle, the first defeat of Yankee Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere was the proudest 
moment of my life.”154
151 Anonymous Militia Veteran. Conversation with author, Havana, Cuba, 2011. 
152 Juan Carlos Rodríguez, The Inevitable Battle: From the Bay of Pigs to Playa Gíron (La Habana: Editorial 
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The counter-revolution was almost totally shattered by this defeat. Most of the 2506 
Brigade was in custody, and the vast majority of their support groups in the cities were as 
well.155 Only small detachments of counter-revolutionary operatives hiding in the mountains
remained operational. The U.S. government was discredited, and the Kennedy brothers were 
furious with the CIA and also the anti-Castro community for their plummeting success rate. The 
only thing more frustrating to the Kennedy Administration was the fact that their plausible 
deniability was now shattered.156 Counter-revolutionary strategy once again shifted from one of
sabotage and invasion to one of assassination. Operation Mongoose, as it came to be called, was 
a set of plans to assassinate Fidel Castro and other revolutionary leaders based on the assumption 
that without Castro, the revolution would collapse. At this point, the clandestine war became far 
more personal between the leaders in Washington and Havana. Mongoose operatives were pulled 
from the ranks of the 2506 Brigade members who escaped capture on the beach, and from among 
the most militant members of the Miami community. Mongoose ran concurrently with the use of 
stepped-up acts of sabotage, but the focus would be on sowing confusion to help make an 
assassination more likely.157
155 The 1,179 2506 Brigade members who were captured following the collapse of the invasion at Gíron were well 
treated despite their fears. Approximately ten who had been members of Batista’s security forces and who had been 
found guilty of torture and murder were executed, but the vast majority of the prisoners were housed, fed, and 
treated humanely. Each one was given the ability to contact family in the United States. A televised trial that 
resembled a lecture took place in the weeks following the invasion. Castro spoke directly to the brigade members, 
asking them their reasons for becoming counter-revolutionaries. Eventually, after negotiations with the Kennedy 
Administration, they were all released in exchange for baby food and spare tractor parts. The transcripts of the 
interviews, testimonies, and conversations between the invaders and the revolutionary leadership can be found 
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Martínez Pupo and the Commandos Mambíses 
 In the aftermath of the shattering defeat at Playa Gíron, the counter-revolution was forced 
to undergo yet a third transformation. The Kennedy administration had been humiliated by the 
revolutionary forces and demanded that the CIA “do something about Castro once and for all.”158 
From perspective of Kennedy and his advisors, too much money and effort had been spent with 
too little to show for it. The Cuban Revolution was even more consolidated after the Bay of Pigs, 
and most of the counter-revolutionary groups in Cuba had been decimated. Small pockets of 
counter-revolutionaries who had eluded capture had been able to move from the cities into the 
Escombray Mountains and were still staging low-intensity actions against economic and military 
targets, but their limited support network in the cities had been almost totally removed by the 
CDRs and state security services during and after the invasion. Thanks to the CDRs, in 
cooperation with Cuban Intelligence, most known members of the counter-revolution had been 
arrested, effectively cutting off the “bandits,” as they were finally officially labeled, from their 
contacts.159 A new strategy had to be formulated. The plans for Operation Mongoose were 
expanded by a new CIA leadership tasked with quickly making up for the ground lost at the Bay 
of Pigs. The CIA station handlers and their closest assets undertook a host of assassination 
attempts against Castro over the next few years.160 
 Rafael Martínez Pupo had watched the invasion of Cuba very closely.161 Martínez had 
grown frustrated with what he saw as the mishandling of the war on Cuba. His land and money 
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had been used to help fund and prepare the Bay of Pigs operation, but there was little to show for 
it. It was then that he began to use his contacts to found a new counter-revolutionary 
organization that could infiltrate Cuba and effectively wage war on the Cuban economy in a way 
that even if citizens supported the revolution, they would grow weary of the constant economic 
turmoil.162 Martínez became one of a growing body of counter-revolutionaries who began to be
just as frustrated with Washington as the Kennedy Administration was with them.163 There was a
growing sentiment that these prominent counter-revolutionaries could gain better results against 
the revolution if the CIA provided funds and then stepped out of the way. Martínez began to 
utilize his political and economic connections to help organize a new organization, the Comados 
Mambíses. 
162 Alejandro de la Cruz, Child of this Time (Miami: Independent Publication), p. 89-108.  
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Chapter 3: La LuchaContra Bandidos 
Spymasters, Raiders, Pirates, and Assassins 
Ted Shackley was a CIA case officer in 1961. He was appointed to head up part of the 
new task force organized in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. While Operation Mongoose and the 
assassination campaign against Fidel Castro and the rest of the revolutionary leadership was 
underway, it was Shackley who was meant to coordinate a second tier effort at aiding the 
counter-revolutionaries remaining hidden in Cuba and maintaining pressure on the Cuban 
economy and military through continued strikes.164 All of this fell under the newly adopted
strategy of “Autonomous Operations.” Counter-revolutionary organizations would now be 
recruited, armed, and funded, but the operations themselves would be planned and executed by 
the émigrés taking up arms themselves. This strategic philosophy was based upon the idea that if 
the CIA was able to set a mass volume of operations running concurrently against Cuba, it was 
more likely that one would be successful.165 This was a significant change from the previous
strategy of organizing all activity to supplement one major effort like the invasion at the Bay of 
Pigs. 
Rafael Martínez became one of Shackley’s first operators. Martínez had been involved at 
various levels with the counter-revolution and the CIA since the earliest days of 1959, and in 
every instance his resources and support had been used in what amounted to a series of failures. 
164 Ted Shackley and Richard Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 
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The transition to the autonomous period of clandestine activity provided Martínez and others like 
him the opportunity to be in more direct control of how their resources were utilized. They were 
also given the chance to choose their own targets and use their own contacts.166 These groups 
were diverse in political standing and in their willingness to target civilians. This web of 
autonomous organizations began training in secret locations in Central America and the U.S. 
south. By early 1962, the first operations were being carried out. It should be reemphasized that 
the autonomous groups were meant to take part in Operation Mongoose or at least supplement 
that operation which had made the assassination of Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders the top 
priority of clandestine activity.167  
In essence it was the combination of these assassination attempts and the politics that 
bred them, with the tactics of allowing well-equipped, well-trained, and well-funded counter-
revolutionaries to operate with impunity that led to a cycle of terrorist activity that remains 
ongoing. The further these groups were pushed from achieving their goal, the more 
uncontrollable they became and eventually many of their activities went beyond what the U.S. 
government had originally envisioned. U.S. government policy through the CIA had created a 
counter-revolutionary monster that haunted U.S. policy makers until the Reagan Administration 
reintroduced a policy of open hostility towards Cuba in the early 1980s and these assets were 
once again reactivated as CIA operatives. 
The Mongoose and Autonomous operational period was marked by competition between 
counter-revolutionaries to maintain the financial patronage of the CIA. Two main camps 
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developed.168 Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles are two examples of those competing 
against other militants like Rafael Martínez for continued financial support. Their work 
incorporated terror attacks against Cuban citizens as well as an extensive list of plans and 
attempts on the life of Fidel Castro. Many of these plans rival Ian Fleming’s James Bond in their 
cinematic flair. From the beginning of 1962 the attempts against Castro ran the gamut from 
poisoned cigars and milkshakes, to attempts at the use of improvised explosives, bazooka 
attacks, and snipers.169 The CIA utilized its contacts in the U.S. organized crime community to 
incorporate new operatives who had maintained ties with many of the leaders of the counter-
revolutionary émigrés.  With the help of the Mafia, it was believed that once again the CIA could 
maintain plausible deniability by blaming the Mafia for aggression on the one hand and working 
along with them on the other.170 Eventually operatives like Bosch and Carriles came out on top 
of the competition and went on to form Alpha 66 and Omega 7, two of the most notorious 
terrorist organizations in the western hemisphere. 
For his part, Rafael Martínez sought to prepare strikes on military and economic targets 
in order to draw out Cuban military forces and engage them in hit and run attacks along the 
Cuban coast. Though welcoming the assassination of Castro, Martínez’s strategy was meant to 
resurrect an internal counter-revolution and one that would not be detected by Cuban 
intelligence. To achieve this, he would create a counter-revolutionary organizations made up of 
veterans. Men would be chosen for their special skills rather than simply their hatred of Castro 
                                                          
168 Ibid. p. 119-122. 
169 To analyze every one of the nearly 600 known attempts and plans against Castro’s life would force this project 
severely off course. For a good analysis of the declassified assassination projects under Operation Mongoose, 
consult Fabian Escalante’s Executive Action: 634 Ways to Kill Fidel Castro.    
170 Jack Colhoun, Gangsterismo: The United States, Cuba, and the Mafia-1933-1966 (New York: OR Books, 2013), 
p. 125-170. 
70 
 
and the Cuban Revolution.171 This was a new strategy within the counter-revolutionary 
organization. Most of the other groups recruited en masse to bolster their ranks. Martínez did not 
seek to recruit from the Miami University campus as so many others had. His recruits were to 
come from veterans of the Bay of Pigs as well as Cubans who had served in the United States 
army in both the Second World War and Korea.172 In essence, he would create a covert strike 
force made up of professionals. The group would avoid capture by basing itself outside of Cuba.  
The commandos would be organized into two units. The smaller of the two would be 
made up of commandos smuggled ashore in Cuba who would operate with whatever counter-
revolutionary bands were still roaming the coast. Their job would be to scout coastal targets for 
the main body of the commandos, secure targets, and await the strike force to destroy them 
before moving back out to sea. The main body of the commandos would be a small naval force 
equipped with fast attack boats that would be difficult to trace on radar. To avoid infiltration and 
capture by Cuban intelligence, the commando’s naval force would be stationed at secret bases in 
southern Florida and in Central America where Martínez hosted a training center for the Bay of 
Pigs. The naval force was organized to strike the pre-selected targets and disappear out to sea. 
The small commando group in Cuba would then attempt to spread the word of the organization’s 
success in an effort to inspire others to take action against the government in their own areas. 
Martínez recruited an acquaintance who had been the head of the air force for the 2506 Brigade 
and who had extensive evasion and concealment training. He was to lead the infiltration team 
and in effect be the eyes and ears of the commandos in Cuba while Martínez would serve as the 
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spokesman for the organization.173 The commandos trained throughout 1962 and began their 
infiltration of Cuba, but things did not go entirely according to plan. Developments in Cuba 
made infiltration more difficult than before. 
Battle in the Escambray  
1962 was an extremely active year in the clandestine struggle between Cuba and the 
counter-revolution. While Operation Mongoose and all of the other counter-revolutionary 
organizations began to rebuild their ranks and introduce new operatives into Cuba, the 
Revolutionary Militias began to sweep the countryside. Brigades of MNR forces were deployed 
in the Escambray and Sierra del Rosario mountain ranges in central and western Cuba. A number 
of the attacks on Cuban military and economic targets as well as assassination attempts 
originated from these areas. The Cuban government sought to get rid of these “bandits,” as they 
were officially called, and cut off the external counter-revolution from its internal operatives. 
This little-known chapter in Cuban revolutionary history was marked with nearly two years of 
combat in the mountains of Cuba in what was essentially a contra-style conflict. Though the last 
of the counter-revolutionary bands in the Escambray were not defeated until early 1964, late 
1962 and early 1963 were the most intense periods of armed conflict between the militias and the 
counter-revolutionaries.174 
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The throughout 1962, the militias broke into sweeping units that would move about the 
mountains in order to draw out the counter-revolutionaries. When engaged, the militias would 
surround a particular area and in many cases the commandos simply surrendered. In other cases, 
however, there were intense firefights between the militia and the commandos. The fighting 
often took a very personal turn. Many of the counter-revolutionaries became well known in their 
areas of operation, and the combat often took on the characteristics of manhunts.175 Victor
Dreke, a revolutionary leader who was charged with leading the “Brigadas Lucia Contra 
Bandidos” or “Struggle Against Bandit Brigades” as the militia units were officially called, has 
written about the fighting in the Escombray. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion and the murder 
of literacy workers the militia ranks were growing, and most engagements with the counter-
revolutionaries resulted in militia victories. These firefights with the militia made it more 
difficult for other commando groups to operate. Commandos like those led by Rafael Martínez 
had problems infiltrating Cuba as more and more of the coast was being patrolled by militia. 
Meanwhile, potential recruits to Marínez’s organization were caught in encirclements and 
firefights with revolutionary forces. By the fall of 1962 the training of Martínez’s commandos 
was moving forward, but the activities of Operation Mongoose and the counter-revolutionary 
bands in the Escombray were temporarily halted by order of Washington. Cold War 
developments forced the efforts against Cuba to stall as the world stood on the brink of nuclear 
war in October of 1962.176
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The October Crisis 
In the face of invasion, embargo, and personal assassination attempts, the Revolutionary 
Government of Cuba entered into new defense talks with the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been 
providing Cuba with conventional weapons since just before the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, and 
this had increased exponentially in the days afterwards. Soviet personnel were training Cuban 
troops and helping to install anti-aircraft units on the island. Following the almost constant 
attacks, the Cuban leadership requested additional support. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
proposed that the Soviet Union install intercontinental ballistic missiles on the island. The chain 
of events surrounding what became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis in the U.S. and the 
October Crisis in Cuba is well known. It is not my purpose to provide a re-narration of these 
events and the complex negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.177 This
project is concerned with the Cuban perspective on these events, and how they corresponded to 
the conduct of the clandestine struggle which was ongoing when U.S. spy planes discovered the 
missiles in Cuba. 
The Cubans were caught in a difficult situation. The U.S. had already invaded once, and 
harassment against the revolution was increasing. Though it was understood that nuclear 
weapons could, in theory, help defend Cuba from a conventional invasion, their presence on the 
island was problematic. The revolutionary leadership understood that the missiles were of little 
use against the counter-revolutionaries. Of equal concern to Fidel Castro was that Cuba maintain 
177 Among some of the best works on Cuba’s perspective on the Missile Crisis which should be consulted by anyone 
interested in looking closer at the specifics of that event are James G. Blight and Philip Brenner’s Sad and Luminous 
Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis (Washington: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 
Cuban historian Tomas Diez Acosta’s October 1962: The Missile Crisis Seen from Cuba (New York: Pathfinder 
Press, 2002), and the recollections of Cuba’s then envoy to the U.N., Carlos Lechuga, in his book, In the Eye of the 
Storm: Cuba in the Missile Crisis (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1995). 
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the moral high ground in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.178 The Cuban Revolution was succeeding
in maintaining its image as a David resisting a massive Goliath to the north. The Soviet 
government recommended that the missiles be installed clandestinely and at the opportune 
moment, forcing them upon the U.S. government in an effort to open more aggressive talks about 
reducing the activities against Cuba and removing the U.S.’s nuclear weapons from Turkey. The 
Cuban leadership accepted the missiles for two reasons. First, it was important that Cuba be able 
to defend itself against a second invasion, a very real possibility at the time, and second, because 
of the Cuban leadership’s sense of internationalism. Castro felt that by accepting the missiles, the 
socialist bloc would in turn be strengthened and a new defensive position could be established.179
Most importantly, Castro recommended that the delivery of the missiles be made public. By 
doing this, Cuba and the Soviets could maintain the moral high ground by not operating 
secretively and could possibly force the issue of negotiations with Washington without even 
installing the missiles. Castro calculated that the threat of the missile installation might have 
been enough to bring Kennedy to the negotiating table.180
Castro assumed that Cuba would be included in all of the negotiations that would 
eventually take place regarding the missiles and Cuba’s sovereignty. This was not the case. Over 
the course of the negotiations in October of 1962, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war 
and Cuba was not invited to the negotiations. Eventually, the U.S. and Soviet governments 
agreed to a withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for the removal of U.S. 
missiles in Turkey and what amounted to a verbal agreement that the United States government 
would not invade Cuba. Castro and the Cuban leadership were furious. They had been treated 
178 Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, Fidel Castro: My Life- A Spoken Autobiography (New York: Scribner, 2006), 
p. 271-291.
179 Jorge Risquet, Interview with Estela Bravo, Havana, Cuba, Fidel the Untold Story, First Run Features, 2003. 
180 Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Interview with Estela Bravo, Fidel the Untold Story, First Run Features, 2003. 
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like children by both sides.181 In the event of a nuclear exchange, Cuba would have been the first 
place obliterated. The missiles were never under Cuban control and had been removed without 
their consent. Today the October Crisis is viewed in Cuba as a dark moment when their 
sovereignty was violated by both allies and enemies. The Cubans, both at the government level 
and much of the population, were enraged that conditions on behalf of Cuba were not tied to the 
removal of the missiles. The Cuban leadership demanded more than just a promise not to invade 
Cuba militarily. They also wanted the U.S. to leave the Guantanamo Naval Base, cease all 
counter-revolutionary activity, and lift the trade embargo.182 None of these stipulations were 
placed upon the U.S. government in their negotiations with the Soviets. These events led to a 
souring of relations with the Soviet Union that lasted nearly two years and opened the doors for a 
possible reevaluation of Cuban foreign policy.183 At the same time, these events had strong 
implications for the conduct of the counter-revolution and the CIA. 
Because of the tension between the superpowers and the risk of nuclear war, the Kennedy 
administration ordered the CIA to contact all of its counter-revolutionary operatives and halt all 
further operations.184 There was fear that continued action could spark a war. It was possible that 
Soviet personnel could be killed or the missiles damaged and set off, triggering a conflict. There 
were too many scenarios to prepare for, so clandestine activity was halted. Halting operations 
                                                          
181 In a conversation with the author, Dr. Manuel Yepe described the reaction of much of the Cuban leadership at the 
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was a difficult task. The web of counter-revolutionary organizations was large and complex. 
Many operatives were out of direct contact with the CIA, and some were caught in engagements 
with the militia. Many counter-revolutionaries now lost confidence in the Kennedy 
administration for a second time. To some, Kennedy was linked to the military defeat of the Bay 
of Pigs and now that the autonomous organizations were operative, they were being held back.185 
For a number of months, organizations like Rafael Martínez Pupo’s risked being deactivated 
before ever being officially sent into action. 
Operatives 
The October Crisis had just ended and a loophole remained in the agreement between the 
U.S. and Soviet governments. Though the United States had agreed publicly not to invade Cuba, 
nothing was said about the support for counter-revolutionaries or any of their possible activities. 
Because these were not uniformed U.S. soldiers and there was no military invasion of Cuba, 
Operation Mongoose and the general clandestine efforts against Cuba were actually increased 
rather than halted in the days following the October Crisis. The orders to halt activity were 
rescinded, and Shackley went back to work. In his memoirs, Ted Shackley describes his first 
meeting with Rafael Martínez Pupo in the fall of 1962. Shackley and his aides had been 
recommended a meeting with an operative who had done work with “the company” before. In 
private correspondence he was known only as “M.” Shackley’s office had been notified that “M” 
had been organizing a commando unit that specialized in naval attacks and would complement 
the autonomous operations well. Upon their meeting, Shackley described Martínez as a 
committed and dignified gentleman who was “just what the doctor ordered.” Shackley described 
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him as an honest man who “just wanted to do something against Castro.”186 Because of
Martinez’s past work with the agency during the preparations for the invasion and his contacts in 
Central America, Shackley felt that he could travel abroad and effectively fulfill his role as the 
spokesman for the commandos. Martínez officially christened the organization the Comandos 
Mambíses shortly after their meeting. Ironically, the name given to this CIA-sponsored 
organization harkens back to the Cuban Wars of Independence. The Mambis were the insurgents 
who fought against the Spanish. Though a little-known organization with an independently 
minded spokesman, the commandos were once again in many ways simply a CIA front 
organization which hurt their image with ordinary Cubans.187
On August 18th 1963, after a substantial number of months organizing in the wake of the
militia sweeps on the island and preparing to make their presence known, the Comandos 
Mambíses attacked their first target.188 Rafael Martínez entered the Miami Herald office in
Guatemala City and announced that the Commandos had bombed the oil refinery in Casilda, on 
the southern coast of Cuba. Martínez claimed that the Commandos would liberate Cuba with the 
more than one thousand operatives they had in Central America, the Dominican Republic and 
within Cuba itself. In reality there were fewer than fifty commandos, most of whom were combat 
veterans with few contacts outside the CIA.189 This was a crack organization of hardline Special
Forces rather than a spontaneous group of ordinary men. The attack was a great success for the 
commandos. Heavy damage was done to the oil refinery almost totally knocking it out of action. 
186 Ted Shackley and Richard Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005), 
p.72-76.
187 Jack Calhoun, Gangsterismo: The United States, Cuba, and the Mafia-1933-1966 (New York: OR Books, 2013), 
p. 222-223.
188 Periódico Revolución, Habana, Cuba, August 19, 1963. Rafael Martínez Pupo Papers (Gainesville, University of 
Florida Latin American Special Collection). 
189 Alejandro de la Cruz, A Child in Exile, Rafael Martínez Pupo Papers, (Gainesville, University of Florida: Lulu 
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The refinery had been one of the largest and most important in Cuba. The commandos then 
disappeared out to sea. Upon his declaration at the newspaper office in Guatemala, Martínez also 
released the “Declaration of the Principles of the Mambí Commandos.”190 This manifesto, 
written by Martínez, outlined the Commandos’ philosophy and political aims. Interestingly 
enough, in an act of political theater, the document claimed that the Commandos had no political 
or economic goals set out for themselves. According to the document, the Commandos sought 
only to remove the “communist dictatorship” from power and reestablish a free market based on 
the equality of all men. The Commandos’ program was in essence a declaration of war against 
the economic facilities and institutions in Cuba that allowed the government and its policies to 
function. The members of the Comandos Mambíses were said to be men from all parts of Cuba 
who were patriots and desired the liberation of Cuba from what they saw as a godless form of 
oppression. In the manifesto, though he was the architect of the entire organization, Martínez 
was labeled merely as the spokesperson for the group. A mysterious operative, “Ignacio,” was 
credited with being the group’s leader inside Cuba.191 “Ignacio” was Manuel Villanueva who had 
been secretly sent to Cuba. The choice of naming him the leader of the group had two purposes. 
One was to create an inspiring, and Robin Hood-style aura surrounding the Commandos. The 
other was to make it seem as if the Commandos were a grassroots Cuban resistance movement. 
The Comandos’ manifesto made one more declaration. It announced its next attack. On 
October 19, 1963, the Commandos announced that they would destroy the major lumber 
production site at Cayo Guin in Oriente Province in the far east of the island.192 Their promise 
was kept. In the early morning hours of the 19th of October, the Commandos went ashore and 
                                                          
190 Rafael Martínez Pupo, Declaracíon de Principios de los Comandos Mambíses,(Gainesville, FL: University of 
Florida Latin American special collection)  
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
79 
bombed the mill, causing extensive damage.193 The Commandos once again disappeared. Their
hit and run tactics had been honed to a fine edge. Up to this point their operations had run very 
smoothly. In order to prevent infiltration by Cuban intelligence, the Commandos were never 
alerted of their targets or their mission days until just hours before the attacks. They would 
receive calls at their secret places of residence in southern Florida and would rendezvous late at 
night. Together the operatives would board the “Rex,” the specialized attack boat that was 
designed by the CIA for secret demolition operations. It was quiet and heavily armed in order to 
defend itself against Cuban or Soviet patrol boats.194 Once off the coast and within range of their
target, the commando team would board smaller, fast-moving landing craft and move toward 
shore. Once in range, the infiltration team led by “Ignacio,” who, in theory, had already secured 
the target site, would then signal the teams on the boats with infrared flashlights. The teams 
would then plant C4 explosives and flee the scene. These attacks were initially quite successful. 
After the first two operations, the Mambi Commandos successfully struck at least two other 
targets in 1963.195
As word spread about the success of the Mambi Commandos, the revolutionary 
government deployed more militia units to coastal refineries and docks.196 Communiqués
193 Periódico Revolucíón, Havana, Cuba, October 23, 1963, Rafael Martínez  Pupo papers (Gainesville FL, 
University of Florida Latin American special collection). 
194  Alejandro de la Cruz, A Child in Exile, Rafael Martínez Pupo Papers (Gainesville, University of Florida: Lulu 
Publishing, 2011), p. 84-99. 
195 According to news reports in Miami, at the small town of Isabela de la Sagua, the Commandos attacked a squad 
of Cuban naval pursuit ships that the Soviets had recently provided the small Cuban navy. The ships were severely 
damaged and a number of the crew had been wounded. This action would prove to be one of the Commandos’ most 
successful raids as well as one of their last major offensives. Cuba’s navy began to patrol more of the coast and 
eventually ensnared the unit. “Pirate Raiders Rip Cuban Ships,”August. 1963, Miami Herald Rafael Martínez Pupo 
Papers(Gainesville, University of Florida)  
196 The Commandos left propaganda leaflets on a number of occasions both before and after operations. Some of 
these leaflets survive and are housed in the Latin American special collection at the University of Florida. Included 
are original Commando leaflets that give directions on how to make Molotov cocktails and other improvised 
explosives. These were meant to aid in sparking a counter-revolutionary uprising within Cuba which never 
happened. 
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released by the Commandos called upon the Cuban people the shake off their fear and rise up as 
crusaders against communism. At times the Commandos would broadcast from radio stations in 
Guatemala and scatter leaflets in Cuba that bore the Commando logo and demanded an almost 
religious struggle against the revolution.197 A number of them called on the Cubans to serve a 
“just god and combat godless communism.”198 The Cuban media denounced the pirate attacks 
against Cuba as further acts of terrorism against the nation even after the agreements between the 
U.S. and Soviet governments in the wake of the Missile Crisis. Castro also ordered Cuba’s patrol 
boats farther out to sea in an effort to create a defensive perimeter around Cuban’s coastline in 
vulnerable areas.199 On October 21st the Commandos’ luck ran out. The target on that particular 
evening was the large copper mine near Cape Corrientes in the province of Pinar del Rio. After 
the increased deployment of militias to the area during the mop-up operations described earlier, 
the mine was heavily guarded. Evidently, “Ignacio’s” infiltration team had been unable to call 
off the mission, and the Commandos sailed into an ambush. Rather than being met with the 
signal to land, they were met with intense gunfire from the militias. Not wanting to sacrifice the 
mothership, the “Rex,” to the Cubans, the CIA operatives onboard left the coastline, abandoning 
the operatives who were already in action. The latter were taken prisoner. On the following day, 
Castro appeared on television denouncing the attacks and describing the Rex.200 He called upon 
the Kennedy administration to explain these continued acts of hostility. There was no comment 
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form the White House.201 The Comandos Mambíses were in shambles after a short lived string of
successes that had caused serious damage to the Cuban economy. A number of major events 
occurred almost concurrently that would have important implications for the Commandos, U.S. 
policy, and the international climate of hostility surrounding the Cuban Revolution. During the 
last months of 1963 a president was murdered, a grand counter-revolutionary plot was hatched, 
and, finally, an entire foreign policy approach shifted. 
The Rafael Plan 
Rafael Martínez Pupo supposedly only spoke to a select few about his time working with 
the CIA. His grandson, Alejando de la Cruz, was able to compile his grandfather’s recollections 
for posterity. This is valuable even if the book they were compiled into is meant to be a grand 
work of genealogical narrative. It is through these conversations that a window into Martínez’s 
expanding role in the counter-revolution can be found. By late October 1963, with the 
widespread defeat of the counter-revolutionary bands in the Escombray and the capture of a large 
group of the Commandos, Martínez began to organize what would have been one of the most 
ambitious counter-revolutionary plots up to that point. Martínez began to utilize his business 
contacts from across Central America to attempt to organize a second invasion of Cuba. The 
constant back stepping of the Kennedy Administration on the issue of Cuba and clandestine 
action against Castro prompted Marínez to begin to theorize a second invasion with a larger 
strike force and backing that would remain firmly behind the invaders. Through intermediaries 
he was introduced to members of the government of General Francisco Franco of Spain. After 
meeting with members of Franco’s government, Martínez had secured a group of transport ships 
to use as a possible invasion fleet in exchange for preferential trade agreements with Cuba in the 
201 Alejandro de la Cruz, A Child in Exile, Rafael Martínez Pupo Papers (Gainesville, University of Florida: Lulu 
Publishing, 2011), p. 96-99. 
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event that the second invasion was a success.202 It is at this point in the planning process that the 
second invasion that Martínez envisioned became quite complicated. Any second invasion would 
have needed a well-trained and disciplined strike force and, to avoid making the same mistakes 
that had been made during the Bay of Pigs invasion, the troops need to be trained not to expect a 
nation-wide uprising to support them. Martínez turned to members of the French Foreign Legion. 
The French had just lost control of Algeria, and France was now flooded with angry 
former colonial citizens and members of the military. The most right-wing of the French 
military, particularly in the Foreign Legion, made their way to Spain to resettle. Therefore, the 
government of Spain could not only provide the Cuban counter-revolutionaries with ships but 
also with contacts to a very well-trained, very anti-communist group of solders for hire.203 As 
far-fetched as this plan seemed, Martínez still devoted himself to it even while the Commandos 
were in action. According to him, he had secured the support of both Franco and a large body of 
former Foreign Legionnaires that would be supplemented by the Comandos Mambíses and, 
Martínez hoped, U.S. support.204 He believed that this combination would finally be a successful 
military answer to the Cuban Revolution since clandestine assassination attempts and raids had 
borne no fruit. Presumably, Martínez hoped to gain support from the Kennedy White House 
because of the administration’s outspoken willingness to remove Castro. In addition, by taking 
these plans into his own hands, he was falling perfectly within the guidelines of the autonomous 
operational scheme. Events in Dallas, Texas changed all of this. 
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A New President and a New Strategy 
It is not the aim of this project to open the Pandora’s Box of the Kennedy assassination 
and all of its possibilities, but the event itself significantly affected the conduct of the secret war 
against Cuba.205 With the assassination of the president on November 11th 1963, and the 
beginning of the Lyndon Johnson presidency, there were a number of personnel changes and an 
overhaul of the conduct of the war against Cuba. By that November the counter-revolutionary 
bands in the Escombray were mostly gone or laying low, and the Commandos’ assaults had been 
blunted. In the wake of the Kennedy assassination there was a brief halt in activity while the CIA 
and the U.S. government took stock of what had happened. Castro declared his sorrow at the 
assassination of Kennedy and called for the politics of murder to end. This must have been a 
difficult moment for the counter-revolutionaries since they had little idea of how their struggle 
would continue under Johnson. Martínez was in the middle of organizing his massive plans for a 
second invasion of Cuba, and within months he was prepared to give the proposal to Johnson. 
Martínez wrote Johnson offering his condolences regarding the late president Kennedy, but he 
asked that the fight against Cuban communism not end, especially since Kennedy was such a big 
part of it. Even with all of the planning taking place, 1963 would prove to be the end of the 
Struggle Against Bandits, and the beginning of a new form of antagonism against the Cuban 
Revolution. 
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In December of 1963 and January of 1964 the clandestine front was relatively quiet. 
Martínez finalized his invasion plans but still required U.S. backing for two reasons. One was 
financial and political. Martínez needed additional funds to purchase more aircraft to transport 
paratroopers and supplies into battle, and he also needed to arrange political recognition for a 
newly organized government in exile. In early 1964, Martínez presented Ted Shackley with the 
“Rafael Plan,” as he called it. The Johnson Administration and the CIA were immediately 
concerned about the operation. Rafael Martínez did not receive the reaction he was hoping for.206
The Johnson Administration was growing fearful that the autonomous operations were getting 
out of hand. This was an inherent contradiction in the entire strategy.207 The U.S. government
had wanted to maintain plausible deniability and not risk using U.S. combat forces so, in theory, 
having the Cuban counter-revolutionaries work on their own would have been just the sort of 
operation the CIA was looking for. On the other hand, the U.S. government also did not want to 
be dragged into an open conflict at the behest of a small group of people in Miami if the 
operation failed. Johnson was more concerned at this point with Southeast Asia where in 
battleground nations the United States could still influence the outcomes. Cuba’s revolution was 
consolidated, and rather than continue to pour resources into removing it, the Johnson 
Administration began to gear its strategy towards containing it. On April 7th 1964, the CIA 
officially ceased Operation Mongoose and almost all clandestine activity in Cuba. Organizations 
like the Comandos Mambíses had their funding cut and were disbanded.208
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Though hostility toward Cuba on the part of the U.S. government did not disappear, its 
focus was now placed on “preventing other Cubas” across Latin America and the developing 
world.209 The struggle between the Cuban Revolution and U.S. foreign policy continued through 
the U.S.’s internationalization of the trade embargo against Cuba and the pressure it placed on 
other national liberation movements and Cuba’s material and ideological support for 
revolutionary movements across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But what eventually happened 
to the counter-revolutionaries? Some, like Rafael Martínez, went back to their businesses or 
started new ones in the United States. Others used their anti-communist credentials to rise to 
prominence in U.S.  politics. The Miami lobby against the Cuban Revolution remains a powerful 
political force during election years. There were others who continued their activities without 
direct U.S. support. Many who had been well-placed operatives in the 1959-1963 period carried 
out acts of terrorism within the United States against moderate voices in the émigré community, 
and others remained in the service of the CIA around the world, or as advisors and operatives for 
other national security regimes in Latin America.210 The latter group would be brought back into 
the spotlight of political prominence on the eve of the of Ronald Reagan’s ascension to the White 
House. In that environment, in the wake of the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, reactionaries 
found willing backers in a renewed effort against the Cuban Revolution.211  
The Struggle Against Bandits is a chapter of Cuba’s history marked by the victory of 
ordinary Cubans who turned out time and again to prevent the destruction of their revolution. It 
was a remarkable feat given that time and again the counter-revolution and its CIA backers were 
                                                          
209 Clara Nieto, Masters of War: Latin America and U.S. Aggression from the Cuban Revolution through the Clinton 
Years (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), p.206-311. 
210 Jesús Arboleya, the Cuban Counter-Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000), 
p.218-256. 
211 Clara Nieto, Masters of War: Latin America and U.S. Aggression from the Cuban Revolution through the Clinton 
Years (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), p. 312-398. 
86 
 
forced to reevaluate their strategy. Cuba’s resistance to these efforts had far-reaching 
implications for U.S. policy makers and for the CIA’s operatives themselves. In this sense, the 
example that Cuba’s resistance against the counter-revolution set for developing nations had a 
geopolitical influence that far exceeded the island nation’s small size.  
  
87 
Conclusion: The Balance Sheet of Siege 
Not a Cliché: Popular Organization and Resistance 
After analyzing clandestine struggle between the counter-revolutionary movement, 
bolstered by the CIA on the one hand and the Cuban Revolution with its very newly formed 
intelligence and security services on the other, there are a few very important and very specific 
conclusions and observations that can be reached regarding what is lacking in the overall 
scholarship on this period. The first and foremost is that Cuba’s revolutionary intelligence 
services, organized between 1959 and 1960, were among the youngest and most un-tested 
national intelligence apparatuses in the world and have been continually successful in defending 
the revolutionary state. Cuba’s revolutionary movement, after having waged an armed struggle 
and overthrowing the previous government, was almost immediately subject to attack. What is 
seldom described in the mainstream historiography is the fact that upon the initiation of 
hostilities on the part of the U.S. government and the counter-revolution, Cuban intelligence was 
forced to begin a crash program of organization and defensive preparations in the military, 
intelligence, and civilian spheres.212
212 Often in popular discourse surrounding the development of the clandestine struggle, Cuba’s intelligence services 
are thought to have been organized and staffed by Soviet intelligence, particularly the KGB. This is highly unlikely 
and is another example of the almost constant underestimation of Cuba’s mass organizations and military, political, 
and intelligence apparatus. The Soviet Union did not establish relations with the Cuban revolution until late 1960, 
and those relations did not include military and defense agreements until the run-up to the invasion of Playa Gíron. 
It seems unlikely that Cuban intelligence would be able to absorb Soviet instruction and organize at the grassroots 
level following Soviet methods over such a short period of time. It is an amazing feat in and of itself that Cuban 
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 Rather than being made up of seasoned spies and operatives, the Cuban intelligence 
services were comprised of mostly very young revolutionary volunteers. Many of these cadre 
had not taken part in the guerrilla struggle or the student underground but saw themselves as 
having a role in the consolidation and, more importantly, the defense of their newly won 
revolution. What separated the members of Cuba’s intelligence services from so many around 
the world was that they incorporated the public. Unlike like the CIA or the KGB, the Cuban 
forces filled their ranks from the many mass-organizations that were forming in the period 
immediately following the rebels’ seizure of power. In response to the CIA’s attempts on the life 
of the revolutionary leadership as well as the counter-revolution’s constant harassment of the 
Cuban economy and social programs, the country’s leadership called for the mobilization of all 
sectors of society in order to defend the nascent revolution. The CDRs were organized in 
response to the continued airstrikes from unmarked planes launched from Miami, the burning of 
department stores and cane fields, and the murder of agricultural workers and teachers in the 
rural areas of the country. Rather than frighten the public as they were meant to, in response to 
the attacks hundreds of thousands of people on that tiny island turned out to join the CDRs.213  
 Within two years, there were CDRs in almost every neighborhood of Havana, and by the 
end of the decade of the 1960s they were in every municipality of Cuba. The majority of the 
intelligence gathered by Cuban security services was provided by CDRs.214 CDRs provided a 
defensive role for the public to play. Rather than claim to protect and defend Cuba on behalf of 
the public, Cuba’s leadership called on citizens to join CDRs and organizations like them so that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
intelligence was able to mobilize as quickly as it did independently. The key to this was the broad mass of 
revolutionary militants who did not let their political guard down following the flight of Batista and continued to 
hone their skills in the days before the Bay of Pigs. Fabian Escalante, Interview with Saul Landau in  Will the Real 
Terrorists Please Stand Up (Cinema Libre, 2011)   
213 Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 
p. 68-82. 
214 Dr. Manuel Yepe. Havana, Cuba, conversation with author, November 2013. 
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they could take part in their own defense. This was a monumental boost to the morale of the 
revolution’s supporters. Rather than simply living through events, citizens could effect change 
and move events along through their participation. This is rarely discussed in the 
historiographical literature surrounding this period, and when it is, it is normally dismissed as 
political cliché.215 For people in the middle of a great revolutionary moment, it is not a cliché to
desire a role in the defense of that process. In the cases of the U.S. and its allies, these events are 
viewed through the lens of Fidel Castro as the “maximum leader” of the revolution, but it is vital 
to look beyond that because although the leadership was and certainly remains the face of the 
revolution abroad, it is the Cuban public that filled the literal and political trenches in response to 
the activities of the counter-revolution. Members of the CDRs reported suspicious activity, 
monitored strange vehicles coming and going from work places, and organized neighborhood 
watches. They would meet to discuss political issues and make sure that information was readily 
available to the local population. In all of the thwarted attempts on Castro’s life as well as the 
rooting out of counter-revolutionary cells in Cuba’s cities and towns, most of the intelligence 
was gathered simply by concerned citizens in CDRs and through the general observation of the 
countryside by those who lived there. 
Along with the CDRs, the National Revolutionary Militias were also vital in the defense 
of the Cuban Revolution. The MNRs were largely responsible for the battlefield defeat of both 
the invasion of Playa Gíron and the counter-revolutionary bands in the Escombary Mountains. 
The militias were an all-volunteer force that trained and armed members of the population and 
215 These observations are often rejected as simply revolutionary rhetoric rather than the legitimate sentiments of 
many Cubans at this time. In Jim Rasenberger’s The Brilliant Disaster, and Grayston Lynch’s Descision for 
Disaster, both authors exemplify the commonly accepted idea that the revolutionaries were political opportunists 
and that the Cuban public was either brain-washed or terrified into obedience.  
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mobilized them for national defense.216 The militias provided a much needed fighting force since
the Rebel Army, from 1959 through to the mid-1960s, was in a process of retooling and 
rearming.217 By the late 1960s, the Rebel Army had officially become the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Cuba (FAR), a uniformed military receiving weapons from the Soviet bloc. Though it 
retained its roots as a guerrilla force, the FAR was being trained by Soviet advisors in 
conventional warfare. It was during this difficult process that so many of these counter-
revolutionary assaults were launched. Though the FAR was by no means absent from the field of 
battle, most of the country’s defense fell to the militias. The militias maintained units in 
factories, on university campuses, and on communal farmlands. Recruits were trained on certain 
days and worked at their regular occupations on others, with periodic long marches and 
exercises. Maintaining a committed force of armed citizens supporting the restructuring of 
society proved to be a matter of life and death for the Cuban revolution as both invasion and 
armed assault were defeated by militia columns. These volunteer mass organizations have been 
the sustaining defensive arm of the Cuban revolution through some of its most difficult 
periods.218 It was these sorts of participatory organizations, especially the armed militias, that the
216 The training and deployment of the militias is described in detail in the first hand account of Victor Dreke in his 
book, From the Escombray to the Congo: In the Whirlwind of the Cuban Revolution. 
217 Victor Dreke, From the Escambray to the Congo: In the Whirlwind of the Cuban Revolution (New York: 
Pathfinder Press, 2002), p. 89-117. 
218 The MNRs and CDRs were instrumental in community outreach during the Special Period in the 1990s. The 
MNRs were an organization men and women were encouraged to join. The revolutionaries’ idea was to recruit 
willing cadres, not force potentially angry citizens into service and provide them with arms. The CDRs are often 
viewed by critics of the Cuban Revolution as the coercive “big brother” that was meant to inform on citizens and pit 
neighbor against neighbor over concerns of loyalty to the nation. Though there certainly are social pressures to “do 
your part” for the defense of the country and the revolution, the CDRs are not a service of conscription. Beyond this, 
the mass organizations provide a long list of other services an addition to their old Cold War function of defense. 
Today the CDRs take part in public works, clean up, and social services. The MNRs partake in both defense as well 
as urban farming and the implementation of sustainable agriculture. 
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Cuban revolutionary leadership constantly advised fraternal revolutionary movements across 
Latin America to adopt for their own defense.219 
 In the final analysis, along with the Federation of Cuban Women, the National Trade 
Unions, and the Union of Small Farmers, all of which were part of the wider revolutionary 
reforms taking place, the most important defense assets the Cuban Revolution possessed  against 
the clandestine efforts to derail it were its people. It is not the aim of this study to minimize the 
role of the committed leadership of the Cuban revolution, but too often the leadership is viewed 
as the totality of the revolutionary process. The defeat of the counter-revolution succeeded 
because ordinary Cubans in their hundreds of thousands refused to go backwards in time. 
Though seemingly a simple observation, it is missing from most of the scholarship. It is a 
remarkable feat that an intelligence community made up of very young men and women with no 
experience and supported by ordinary citizens was able to counter the efforts of the CIA, one of, 
if not the, most powerful intelligence service on the planet. Likewise, an armed counter-
revolution bolstered by the most powerful military on the planet was defeated in its efforts by 
hastily trained militia forces, all within the span of five years. That is really quite remarkable. 
Ordinary Cubans should once again be at the head of this narrative. 
 A testament to the importance of the mass organizations discussed in this project can be 
found in their longevity and continued relevance. The CDRs, MNRs, Federation of Cuban 
Women, and the Central Trade Union all continue to play a vital role in the everyday functioning 
of Cuban political society. In 2013, the CDRs celebrated their 8th Congress where hundreds of 
                                                          
219 Fidel Castro attempted to advise Salvador Allende of Chile that it was necessary to restructure the military as 
well as create armed bodies of revolutionary cadres to resist any attempts at a coup. In recent years the Cuban 
leadership has done the same with Bolivarian Venezuela. Today Venezuela is training militia-like regiments in the 
countryside. Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011), p. 172-174, 257-259. This is also discussed at length in Ariel Dorfman’s Chile: The Other 
September 11th (Sydney: Ocean Books, 2006). 
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thousands of local representatives from the committees traveled to Havana to participate in the 
massive rally and congressional seminars that would lay out the tasks and strategies for the 
committees in the coming years. Though the Cold War is over and the focus of the CDRs is now 
more diverse than defending against counter-revolution, the committees still hold national 
defense as their highest priority. Today the CDRs retain a great deal of responsibility. They are 
in charge of neighborhood watch, repair, and waste disposal, and they serve as a public forum for 
debate.  The CDRs work closely with the Federation of University Students, The Union of 
Young Communists (formed in 1965), and the Central Trade Union to promote healthy living, 
anti-sexism, anti-racism and, more recently, anti-homophobia along with participation in the 
political process.220
Despite many detractors who dismiss the CDRs and the Cuban political structure in 
general as anti-democratic, the CDRs help to foster widespread participation in the Congresses of 
People’s Power, the local administrative apparatus, and its elections.221 According to many
academics within Cuban society, the Revolution could not stand without the CDRs in their 
current rolls within society. They are in fact a vital part of Cuba’s (often prematurely dismissed 
or denied) civil society.222
The National Revolutionary Militias are still an important part of Cuban society. In 
November of 2013, Cuba underwent a massive nationwide military exercise, “Bastion 2013.” 
Every few years, the country stages military maneuvers that incorporate the whole of society. 
220 Mass organizations in Cuba continue the debate within Cuban society about how that society should progress. 
221 The Congress of People’s Power is a representative body made up of locally elected leaders. The Popular Power 
concept was born in the early 1970s (therefore outside of the main focus of this project) as Cuba struggled to 
balance the development of an independent domestic and foreign policy all while maintaining a close relationship 
with the Soviet Union. The Cuban constitution, though based on that of the Soviet Union, at the time maintained a 
different platform for local representation. Representatives are elected through secret ballots and participants are not 
required to be members of the Communist Party or hold any other pre-existing political post.   
222Arnold August, Cuba and its Neighbors: Democracy in Motion (London: Zed Books, 2013), p. 154-176. 
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Students, farmers, and workers are mobilized and trained in national defense, including combat 
matters, debris clean-up, evacuation, and logistics. The militias are mobilized along with the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces and dispersed to various points of the island in defense against a 
mock invasion. The militias are in charge of secret weapons caches, the arms from which are to 
be distributed to other militia units and trained members of the population to defend their 
neighborhoods.223 Though an outright U.S. invasion is now unlikely, these military exercises are
highly organized and an example of how militias and national defense remain very much a part 
of Cuban reality. This national defense system was born out of the 1959-1963 period and the 
clandestine Struggle Against Bandits. The resistance of the Cuban public through these various 
organizations in defense of the gains of their revolution is etched into popular memory on the 
island, and that history motivates the conduct of political policy on the island today. 
The Forced Change in Policy: Effects and Implications 
The second main point of this analysis involves the effects that the resistance of the 
majority of the Cuban populace against the counter-revolution has had on U.S. government and 
counter-revolutionary policy and tactics. We will look at these two faces of counter-revolution 
one at a time. The U.S. policy towards Cuba in all of its manifestations are part and parcel of a 
very long history dating back to the earliest years of following the birth of the United States, 
during the Spanish colonial period in Cuba. The islands of the Caribbean, and Cuba in particular, 
were not just viewed as possible acquisitions by early U.S. policy makers, but as natural 
possessions. American leaders, regardless of mainstream party affiliation, have seemingly been 
obsessed with possessing Cuba. It was John Quincy Adams who first promoted what was called 
the “Ripe Fruit Theory” based on the idea that the islands of the Caribbean would naturally 
223 The author observed some of the proceedings of Bastion 2013 and discussed this with a group of Cuban students 
involved with the mobilization on the campus of the University of Havana, November 21, 2013. 
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gravitate toward the United States rather than Spain and would fall naturally into the hands of the 
U.S. government. Since that time, American leaders have, to greater or lesser degrees, viewed 
Cuba through this lens, in most cases overlooking the political aspirations and aims of the 
Cubans themselves.  
Over the years, as historian Luis Pérez points out, Cuba became a microcosm of 
American imperialism in general.224 In his book, Cuba in the American Imagination, he points 
out that within the history of Cuba’s relationship to the United States we see the long list of 
foreign policy maneuvers of every strategic stripe, including many that would look familiar to 
anyone now living in the twenty first century.225According to Pérez, what truly separates Cuba 
from cases of U.S. foreign relations with other states, and revolutionary states in particular, is 
that Cuba from early on found its way into American popular and political consciousness. Today 
Cuba is one country that most Americans lack knowledge of but at the same time have 
passionate opinions about. Early on, Americans created a self-image that, combined with their 
ideas of what it meant to be a “nation,” came to define and continue to define how they relate to 
other states. This made the creation of a foreign nation-state with different political and 
economic programs not only naturally antagonistic, but subject to paternalistic treatment.226 
 That paternalistic foreign policy had its heyday in the long period between 1898 and the 
triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. In the months leading up to the declaration of war 
against Spain by the United States in 1898, Cuba was portrayed as a beautiful damsel in distress 
                                                          
224 Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 1-10. 
225 Pérez lists: armed intervention, military occupation, nation building, constitution writing, capital penetration, 
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diplomatic relations (and lack thereof), sanctions, political isolation, and economic embargo. All of these are cited 
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in the American media.227 That metaphorical damsel required saving from the Spanish monarchy 
in order to establish “freedom” on the island. After thirty years of prolonged and bloody 
insurgent warfare on the part of Cuban independence fighters against the Spanish, and after those 
same rebels were left out of the peace negotiations, the U.S. imposed military rule over Cuba to 
“oversee its transition to democracy.”228 Any resistance on the part of independence fighters on 
the island was crushed. At this point, rather than being depicted as a damsel in distress, Cuba was 
now portrayed as a racialized child needing to be saved from itself.229 After the triumph of the 
revolution, Cuba was given the form of a bearded maniac, and a threatening outlaw that had to 
be dealt with. In essence, American perceptions, and therefore political and strategic relations 
with Cuba, were and continue to be marked by “yellow journalism.” Today, portrayals of Cuba 
in the U.S. media and by the Cuban émigré community depict Cuba as a giant prison rather than 
the damsel, the child, or the land of the bearded maniac. This represents an ingrained cultural 
aspect of the antagonistic, historical relationship Americans, both in government and private 
citizens, have with Cuba, helping to further the efforts of American leaders to derail the Cuban 
Revolution and struggle against it clandestinely. American leaders viewed Cuba as something to 
be exploited before 1959, and, after 1959, as something that had to be destroyed politically and 
militarily. These images were transferred to and accepted by much of the general populace. 
Though succeeding on the media front in many ways (Cuba is still misunderstood by many 
Americans), the media and American policy makers were unsuccessful in ending the Cuban 
Revolution.  
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The U.S. government’s efforts to derail the Cuban Revolution remain a political and 
ideological frustration for both of the major political parties. Before the Cuban Revolution, the 
CIA had experienced success after success in its removal of revolutionary, and even moderate, 
movements from power in a number of countries around the world. Cuba was expected to be no 
different, especially when its recent past was taken into account (Washington had been selecting 
Cuba’s presidents). On the surface, the conflict between the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations and the Cuban Revolution have been viewed as a Cold War issue, a conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union with Cuba as a proxy.230 Cuba was never a
proxy. Cold War antagonisms between the two superpowers, though certainly an aspect of the 
Cuban-U.S. conflict, are not the totality of the situation. At the point of the Cuban Revolutionary 
reforms, the financial interests of well-placed American and Cuban conglomerates were being 
affected, and the example to the rest of the Americas of Cuba removing Wall Street’s financial 
dominance terrified policy makers in Washington.231 By late 1960, a new stage of the conflict
began that would have implications for the rest of the Americas. Cuba began to pose a threat to 
U.S. hegemony over the Caribbean basin as more and more liberation movements looked to the 
Cubans as a model for their own political and economic independence. 
The image and example of a tiny island nation with young leaders backed by popular 
mass organizations proved to be a great inspiration to millions of people, including communities 
of marginalized people within the United States itself. This combination proved too much for the 
leadership in Washington, and, from their perspective, Cuba’s revolution could not be allowed to 
stand. Conveniently, the U.S. intelligence community could pull willing recruits from a growing 
230 Testimony of Arthr Schlesinger Jr., “Forum on the bay of Pigs invasion Havana” 1992, reproduced in Will the 
Real Terrorist Please Stand Up? Cinema Libre, 2011. 
231 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 64-68. 
97 
body of Cuban émigrés moving to the United States and Central America. The shift to 
clandestine activity was almost seamless as all of the traditional bastions of American power that 
were typically present in Latin American states, and that would have allowed the U.S. 
government to assert itself, were gone from Cuba. Washington’s military mission to Cuba was 
forced out in 1959, and the embassy was removed in 1961.232 However, all of the U.S.
government’s attempts to form organizations to harass the Cuban economy and to invade Cuba 
failed, forcing a change in U.S. policy. The international wave of liberation movements across 
the Third World was accelerating, and U.S. strategic policy had to change accordingly. 
Following the assassination of President John Kennedy in November of 1963, the Johnson 
Administration shifted strategies. Though hostility toward Cuba remained, Johnson’s 
administration cut the financial umbilical cord from Washington and Langley to most of the 
counter-revolution. A select group of well-placed and experienced operatives remained on the 
CIA payroll, but most of the organizations found themselves with no funding and little or no 
logistical support. That support would not return until the years of the Reagan Administration 
and what Morris Morley calls the “return of vendetta politics toward Cuba.”233
The Counter-Revolution: Defeat and Persistence  
The little-known case of the Comandos Mambíses is exemplary of this shift. Though 
successful in a number of their hit and run attacks, they were seen by the Johnson Administration 
as too little and too late to remove the Cuban Revolution, and many policy makers in 
Washington saw them as getting out of control and responded by rejecting the so-called Rafael 
Plan for a second invasion of Cuba. Following the cutting of funding to the complex web of 
232 Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.72-73. 
233 Ibid., 319-330. 
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organizations like the Commandos, U.S. policy shifted to containment rather than outright 
invasion or continuous assassination attempts. It was the example of Cuba that had to be 
contained. The Johnson Administration was preparing to expand the U.S. intervention into 
Southeast Asia, which would turn world attention away from Cuba. Examples of “preventing 
other Cubas” can be seen throughout Latin America. The U.S. invasion of the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 was the first in a long line of preemptive and “preventative interventions” in 
Latin America meant to blunt Cuba’s example and the support Cuba was providing to Latin 
American revolutionaries. Venezuela experienced CIA activity throughout the 1960s as did 
Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and eventually Argentina in the 1970s. Grenada was invaded in 1983 in 
an effort to prevent revolutionaries from establishing themselves there, not to mention 
Washington’s role in the civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The right-wing 
military governments that controlled most nations in Latin America in this period were supported 
by Washington for their suppression of revolution, the left, and even moderates and apolitical 
bystanders. Even beyond the Cold War there has been a new wave of U.S. involvement in the 
domestic politics of Latin American nations. Washington’s efforts to harass the Bolivarian 
government in Venezuela continue to manifest this same style of political intervention and 
vendetta politics. 
 Cuban émigré operatives were involved in most of these reactionary activities indicating 
the level of direct or indirect involvement in most of them. Even in Africa and Asia, from 
Vietnam to Angola, Cuban émigré operatives of the CIA undertook armed action against national 
liberation movements at the CIA’s behest.234 While efforts against the Cuban Revolution did not 
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completely halt, resources were shifted elsewhere to counter other liberation movements. This 
shift in strategy was a direct result of the effective resistance of Cuba’s public and their support 
of their own intelligence community. 
In regards to counter-revolutionary organizations like the Commandos, the conclusion as 
to why they were continuously unsuccessful in their final aim of removing the Cuban Revolution 
is one of legitimacy. In many classrooms, the historical narrative is one of a series of military 
miscalculations and sheer bad luck. However, the complex web of émigré organizations lacked 
political legitimacy on the island and suffered from the lack of a unified political vision for 
Cuba. Though sold to the public of the United States through the media as bands of anti-
communist democrats, most of the émigré operatives were seen in Cuba as political gangsters of 
the old dictatorial order, or as those who sought to turn back the social, political, and economic 
clock to the pre-1959 era. The tactics utilized by the counter-revolution did not endear them to 
the Cuban public either. Every time they assassinated a teacher, that was someone’s daughter or 
son who was working to bring literacy to the countryside. Every time a field, factory, or shop 
was bombed or burned, that was someone’s job that was lost. These efforts were not viewed as 
attacks just against a government, but against the community. It seems that counter-
revolutionaries never lost their view of themselves as crusaders, which caused a disconnect 
between themselves and those for whom they claimed to fight. 
The clandestine struggle in this period remains fresh in the minds of the many counter-
revolutionaries within the émigré community. Despite their age, prominent members of these 
groups still operate within Miami and are a cause celebré within conservative circles. They 
remain bitter about their defeat by the Cuban Revolution and also about what they view as their 
being sold out by multiple presidential administrations. They were funded and trained by the 
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CIA and then, from their perspective, they were pushed to the periphery without being given a 
chance to succeed. The darkest side of the clandestine struggle is certainly the legacy of 
terrorism that continues into the present. What occurred to the metaphorical counter-
revolutionary animal formed during the 1959-1963 period was that, although it was defunded, it 
nevertheless remained to bite the hands of both its enemies and its former benefactors. Through 
the 1970s and 1980s there were strings of bombings in Miami and New York as well as a 
continued arming of organizations like Alpha 66 and Omega 7. Though not directly under the 
orders of the CIA, these organizations were made up of veterans of the original clandestine 
struggle, and through the finances they were able to save and raise from the angry Miami 
community, they were able to continue their activities with almost total impunity. Quite simply, 
the leaders of these organizations, although they frustrated many U.S. policy makers with their 
activities, knew too much to be “reined in.”235 
 Luís Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch rank among the counter-revolution’s most 
notorious terrorists. Carriles, a former policeman under Batista and a CIA operative in the 1960-
1963 period, was involved with acts of terrorism against Cuba from bases in Central and South 
America for decades. He was most recently responsible for a string of hotel bombings in Havana 
in the 1990s in efforts to frighten foreigners away from the island.236 Orlando Bosch, a very 
outspoken anti-Castro militant, was involved in a number of bombings of radio stations and 
attempts on the lives of journalists in Miami who advocated dialogue between the United States 
and Cuba. Bosch, along with Carriles, was involved in what became the worst terrorist attack 
against Cuba to date, which was the 1976 bombing of Cubana Airlines flight 455 from Barbados, 
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killing everyone aboard including the entire Cuban Olympic fencing team.237 When questioned 
about the bombing, Bosch replied simply that he “slept like a baby and that those killed on the 
airline were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time.”238 He was eventually awarded 
certificates of honor from the University of Miami. This bitterness and violence are the after-
effects of the formation of a complex and well-armed counter-revolution that was eventually 
pushed to the periphery by Washington only to be turned to periodically to deploy around the 
world to quell revolutionary movements. In exchange for these services, Washington often 
turned a blind eye to the counter-revolutionaries’ terrorist activities activities, which included 
everything from assassination attempts on the lives of Cuban diplomats to the U.N., to the car 
bombing in Washington D.C. that killed Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. In effect, as the 
Cuban Revolution attempted to globalize its struggle through its example and aid to 
revolutionary and national liberation movements the world over, the counter-revolution 
attempted to globalize its activities as well. Omega 7 and Alpha 66 take on a more radical course 
of action than the Comandos Mambíses, but they are both the political and military grandchildren 
of the “Bandits.” 
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Appendix A 
Major Acts of Terrorism against Cuba During the Struggle Against Bandits, 1959-1963 
 June 7, 1959- Cuban Embassies in Haiti and the Dominican Republic are attacked by 
counterrevolutionaries. 
 June 10, 1959- Car of Cuban ambassador to the Dominican Republic riddled with bullets 
in an attack carried out by former Batista officers. 
 July 4, 1959- Cuban consul in Miami is attacked by Batista supporters. 
 July 14, 1959- Cuban cargo plane hijacked by counterrevolutionary operatives.  
 August 1959- Former Batista military officers along with operatives of the CIA and 
intelligence operatives of Rafael Trujillo attempt an assault on Cuba which is suppressed. 
 October 21, 1959- Unmarked planes strafe downtown Havana and western Cuba. 
 October 22, 1959- Civilian passenger train in Las Villas is machine-gunned by counter-
revolutionaries in an unmarked plane.  
 January 1960- Month-long string of cane field burnings and factory sabotages by 
counterrevolutionary bands in efforts to cripple the Cuban economy. Two 
counterrevolutionary planes are shot down. Two U.S. pilots are captured. 
 January 12, 1960- Counterrevolutionary napalm attacks on Cuban sugar cane fields in 
Havana province.  
 January 20, 1960- More cane bombings in Las Villas. 
 January 28, March 2, 1960- More than five recorded aerial bombardments from 
unmarked planes on Cuban factories and farms with napalm and white phosphorus.  
 March 4, 1960- Explosion of La Coubre causes more than 100 deaths and over 200 
wounded. 
 March 9, 1960- Reporter for Revolucíon newspaper is attacked in an assassination 
attempt in Miami. 
 April 9, 1960- Counterrevolutionary band in the Escombry murder a peasant. 
 May 7, 1960- Havana offices of La Calle newspaper are bombed. 
 May 31, 1960- Revolutionary newspaper office attacked in a drive by shooting by 
counterrevolutionary band. 
 August 16, 1960- First attempt on the life of Fidel Castro. 
 August 24, 1960- Unmarked boats shell Miramar neighborhood in Havana. 
 December 26, 1960- Counterrevolutionaries set fire to Havana department store. 
 January 5, 1961- Teenage literacy brigade member Conrado Benitez is murdered by 
counter-revolutionary band. 
 February 22, 1961- Literacy worker Pedro Morejón murdered by counterrevolutionaries. 
 March 12, 1961- Oil refineries in Santiago de Cuba and Matanzas are bombed by 
counterrevolutionaries. 
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 April 13, 1961- El Encanto department store is firebombed resulting in the death of Fe de 
Valle. 
 April 15, 1961- Airstrikes by aircraft painted with Cuba insignia against Cuban airports 
and airfields resulting in civilian deaths. 
 April 17-19, 1961- The Invasion of Playa Girón. 
 May 7, 1961- Cuban Navy ship sunk by counterrevolutionaries aboard a fast moving 
attack boat.sixteen Cuban sailors are killed. 
 May 28, 1961- Cuban cinema in Pinar del Rio is attacked leading to twenty six children 
and fourteen adults are wounded. 
 July 4, 1961- Counterrevolutionaries hijack a Cubana airliner and murder the guard.  
 November 26, 1961- Literacy worker Manuel Ascunce is tortured and murdered along 
with local farmer by counterrevolutionary band. 
 January 1, 1962- counterrevolutionary attack on the port of Carraguao. 
 January 22, 1962- Counterrevolutionary agents attack small town east of Baracoa. 
 February 10, 1962- Unmarked plane bombs Havana. 
 February 21, 1962- Counterrevolutionaries attack a school in Las Villas 
 April 27, 1962- Fifty workers injured in sabotage on chemical refinery by 
counterrevolutionaries. 
 May 12, 1962- Alpha 66 attacks Cuban ship killing crewmembers. 
 June- July 1962- String of commando raids against hospitals and militia training centers. 
 September 1962- String of bombings perpetrated by Alpha 66.  
 November 1960-October 1962- 14,000 children are removed from their parents after a 
lengthy propaganda campaign enacted by the CIA and the Catholic Church codenamed 
Operation Peter Pan.  
 November 1962- January 1963- Counterrevolutionaries attack a series of mobile cinemas 
meant to bring films to rural Cuba. 
 April-September 1963- String of attacks by Comandos Mambises against Cuban coastal 
targets. 
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Appendix B 
 
Legacies: Major Acts of Terrorism against Cuba, 1964-2012 
 December 11, 1964- Attempt on the life of Che Guevara in a bazooka attack on the U.N. 
building in New York. 
 October 12, 1971- Counterrevolutionaries land at small town of Boca de Sama, and 
killing and wounding numerous innocent civilians. 
 September 9, 1973- Omega 7 bombs Cuba’s U.N mission in New York. Additional bomb 
attacks in October and November. 
 October 4 1973- Fishing boat attacked by counterrevolutionaries resulting in the death of 
the crew. 
 October 6 1976- Cubana flight 455 bombed returning from Barbados, killing all 73 
passengers. 
 Sept 21, 1976- Five Cuban counter-revolutionaries (later indicted) assassinate Chilean 
ex-diplomat Orlando Letelier and assistant Ronni Moffitt. 
 October 1981- Biological attack on Cuba resulting in 158 deaths from introduced dengue 
fever. 
 April- September 1997- Counter-revolutionary bombing campaign in Havana and 
Varadero causing hundreds of wounded and the death of one Italian tourist. 
 April 27, 2012- Travel agency promoting travel and interchange between Americans and 
Cuba is firebombed. Investigation is ongoing. 
 
*All dates are listed in the Chronology Sections of Fabian Escalante’s trilogy on CIA operations 
in Cuba.  
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